Multi-Player War of Attrition with Asymmetric Incomplete Information by Li, Hongcheng
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Multi-Player War of Attrition with
Asymmetric Incomplete Information
Li, Hongcheng
Department of Economics, Yale University
4 September 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/109511/
MPRA Paper No. 109511, posted 01 Sep 2021 13:32 UTC
Multi-Player War of Attrition




This paper models a multi-player war of attrition game with asymmetric incomplete in-
formation on the private provision of one public good to investigate the effect of ex-ante
asymmetry. In the unique equilibrium, asymmetry leads to a stratified behavior pattern
such that one player provides the good instantly with a positive probability, while each of
the others has no probability of provision before a certain moment which is idiosyncratic.
Comparative statics show that one with less patience, lower cost of provision, and higher
reputation in valuation provides uniformly faster. The cost of delay is mainly determined
by the strongest type, namely the highest type of the instant-exit player. This paper con-
siders two types of introduction of asymmetry: raising the strongest type tends to improve
efficiency, whereas controlling the strongest type aligns the effect of asymmetry with the
sign of an intuitive measure of the cost of symmetry.
KEYWORDS. War of attrition, public good, ex-ante asymmetry, multiple players, incomplete
information.
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When cooperation is prohibitively costly for a group of people, any public good can only be
provided privately during a war of attrition. This happens on a daily basis and is one of the
major sources of welfare loss resulting from strategic interaction. Strategic delay is known to be
a major cause of inefficiency in these situations.
One intriguing question is: Does asymmetry matter in such conflicts? Here, asymmetry
refers to the situation where individuals in different economic, political, or social positions are
anticipated differently. This notion corresponds to a large number of applications. For example,
when socioeconomic groups try to shift the burden of stabilization onto each other, the presence
of several incumbent groups who feel more pressured to conduct fiscal stabilization creates
asymmetry. For another, when several countries or provinces suffer from illegal activities on their
common border, the different costs of controlling the chaos faced by different agents introduce
asymmetry. Moreover, when the United Nations gathers countries to reach an agreement on
how humanity should respond to climate change, the different incentives of different countries to
make voluntary commitment also bring asymmetry.1 Finally, ex-ante asymmetry also lies in the
discriminative stereotypes that people have to others based on the impression of race, gender,
age, and other social elements that label people.
This issue raises compelling questions: How does asymmetry change behavior? How does this
asymmetric behavior pattern make each agent contribute to welfare differently? Does asymmetry
alleviate or exacerbate delay? Can we be better off by sharpening or equalizing asymmetry?
This paper develops a generalized war of attrition that combines ex-ante asymmetry, multiple
players, and incomplete information. Such a general combination is missing in the literature2 of
the war of attrition and other similar forms of conflict.
My model provides an asymmetric extension of Bliss and Nalebuff (1984). They discuss a
continuous-time war of attrition on the private provision of an indivisible public good in which
each player chooses a provision time in the beginning to optimize his expected utility, and once
1Detailed explanations for these three examples. The symmetric analysis of the first example has been done
by Alesina and Drazen (1991). The second example corresponds to the Golden Triangle area, the common border
of Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar, which is also not far from China. The rampant illegal dealing of drugs and
long-lasting violent activities are the consequence of delayed and loose regulation from the neighbor countries.
Asymmetry does exist in this case, as Thailand implements relatively more strict regulations than others. Besides,
many other famous drug-trade areas are also the common borders of several countries, like the Golden Crescent
and the Silver Triangle. For the last example, the Paris Agreement is a good manifestation. While China has
shown willingness, the United States kept postponing the progress and eventually exited this agreement.
2I list some examples with two of the three elements. For multi-player asymmetric wars of attrition with
complete information, see Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985, 1990), Whinston (1988), and Bildeau and Slivinski
(1994). Examples into multi-player symmetric wars of attrition with incomplete information are Riley (1980),
Bliss and Nalebuff (1984), Alesina and Drazen (1991), Bulow and Klemperer (1999), and Sahuguet (2006).
The two-player asymmetric incomplete-information case is the most widely studied, for example, Riley (1980),
Nalebuff and Riley (1985), Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), Kornhauser, Robinstein, and Wilson (1988), Ponsati
Sakovics (1995), Abreu and Gul (2000), Myatt (2005), and Horner and Sahuguet (2010). Also, there are special
cases that consider all three elements. For example, a third party strategically interferes in a two-player war
of attrition (e.g., Casella and Eichengreen (1996) and Powell (2017)), and two groups bargain over two objects,
which however is basically a two-player game (e.g., Ponsati and Sakovics (1996)). The most related study is
Kambe (2019) who investigates a model similar to mine but with two-type incomplete information.
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someone provides first, the game ends, and everyone gains lump-sum payoff according to their
information. My model differs in that I allow all players’ information, like costs, discount rates,
and valuation distributions, to be asymmetric. Additionally, to guarantee a unique equilibrium,
I assume that every player is anticipated to have a positive probability of valuing the public
good less than his cost.
This paper finds that heterogeneous individuals manifest a stratified behavior pattern. One
degenerate example of this concept commonly seen in two-player cases3 is instant exit. That is,
one of the players will have a positive probability of conceding immediately.
Apart from instant exit, there is also strict waiting which refers to the feature that some
players will have no positive probability of provision until certain time points associated with
each of them. This is not possible in two-player cases, for the highest types of both players
always provide instantly. For each player who waits strictly, I call the minimal waiting time
among all his types the strict-waiting time.
As a result, when the environment is asymmetric enough, the equilibrium behavior begins
with some probability of one player’s instant exit, and what follows is a period during which only
two players have the probability of provision, and after it a third player becomes active, and in
this manner periods with increasing numbers of active players follow sequentially. Eventually,
only when the game has endured for a sufficiently long time will all players become active.
Instant exit could be construed as a “one-player period” whose length is zero because there is
no provision from others and any delay is unnecessary. The idea that asymmetry affects the
outcome by changing the scale of active players has been studied in earlier yet less general cases4.
This stratified equilibrium results from the asymmetric incentive positions of different types.
Individual optimality requires the types revealed simultaneously to balance each other’s incen-
tives mutually. Namely, the types being revealed at the same time and the manner in which
they are revealed are such that each of them will find the extra gain from providing immediately
equal that from waiting slightly longer at this moment. This mutual-balance requirement makes
the incentives faced by different types, to some extent, comparable. For example, types that
exit instantly value the public good so much that no simultaneous revelation with other types
can offset their high incentives, so they are in higher incentive positions. In contrast, some
players wait strictly because even their highest types still value the good too low to be mutually
balanced with earlier revealed types, and thus they are in lower incentive positions.
Intuitively, I call a player stronger if he has a positive probability of providing instantly or if
he strictly waits shorter, and the former case corresponds to the strongest player whose highest
valuation is called the strongest type. Comparative statics tell that either lower cost, more
impatience, or “consistently higher” valuation distribution reduces a player’s provision time and
thus makes him stronger.
On the uniqueness of equilibrium, a huge literature obtains uniqueness by perturbing a war
of attrition. Namely, for each player, there must be a positive probability of some others’ never
3A seminal work that mentions instant exit is Nalebuff and Riley (1985), and among more recent studies are
Ponsati and Sakovics (1995), Riley (1999), Abreu and Gul (2000), and Myatt (2005).
4See Bergstrom et al. (1986), Hillman and Riley (1989), and Kambe (2019).
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conceding.5 Yet, most articles involve only two players or essentially complete information6, while
this paper considers multi-person interaction and continuous-type information, which generates
a nonlinear differential system that has irregular boundary conditions such that each of them is
either flexible or at infinity. The perturbation I employ is to allow every player to have a positive
probability of valuing the public good less than his cost, in which never conceding is the dominant
strategy. This assumption makes the solution of the differential system change sensitively at
infinity so that the boundary conditions suffice to uniquely determine an equilibrium.
The second contribution of this paper lies in a complete discussion of the relationship between
ex-ante asymmetry and social welfare.
First, I utilize the expected discount factor as a measure of welfare level to answer who
matters the most and how he matters. For the former question, social welfare is mainly decided
by the strongest type. Nonetheless, the answer to the second is surprising. It is commonly
believed in the literature that the strongest type matters merely because it is the highest type
of the instant-exit player who makes the most contribution. However, my results tell that the
strongest type matters independently by determining the ranking of all types’ incentives, which
to some extent, is independent of the behavior of other types of the strongest player. For
example, the welfare level of the special case, AD war, discussed in Section 3.3 is irrelevant to
the variations in players’ behavior as long as the strongest type is fixed, and this result makes the
focus on the strongest player’s exact behavior, like his instant-exit probability7, less important.
The idea is that the strongest type “controls” the behavior of all types, and since the welfare
is an integral with respect to all players’ behavior which “closely follows” the strongest type,
its level is mainly decided by the latter. The asymmetric dependence among players’ behavior
demonstrates one form of the “controlling”. In the AD-war case, while the parameter variation
of a weak player sheds no influence on stronger types’ behavior, the variation of a strong player
effectively changes weaker types’ behavior. Additionally, the analysis of large-population soci-
eties in Section 4.1 presents a more general result that the highest type of each player completely
determines his incentive position, which also implies asymmetric dependence.
Second, I investigate the impact that asymmetry has on welfare. That introducing asymmetry
will enhance efficiency is a point commonly made in the literature.8 However, the model analyzed
5For example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) introduce a positive probability of each player being better off in
a duopoly than in a monopoly. Kornhauser, Rubinstein, and Wilson (1989) use a slight probability of irrational
type who only plays a fixed strategy, the idea of which is also borrowed by Kambe (1999, 2019) and Abreu and
Gul (2000). Myatt (2005) considers three forms of perturbation: exit failure, hybrid payoff, and time limit.
6By essentially I refer to Abreu and Gul (2000) and Kambe (2019) where they investigate wars of attrition
with discrete-type incomplete information, but since only one type is rational while all others never concede,
their setups are basically perturbed complete-information games.
7For example, Myatt (2005) and Kambe (2019) stress the importance of the probability of instant exit.
8One extreme example is to select an efficient yet degenerate equilibrium with refinement. For instance, Riley
(1999) lets a sequence of members of a contest-game family approximate a war of attrition, and he finds that any
introduction of asymmetry makes one player concede immediately with probability one. Kornhauser, Rubinstein,
and Wilson (1988) and Myatt (2005) derive similar results in more complex cases. Besides, Kambe (2019) argues
that asymmetry increases the probability of instant exit and further improves efficiency. Some others analyze
welfare directly. For example, Riley’s (1999) numerical calculation of a welfare measure shows a consistently
positive welfare effect of asymmetry; however, the result may hinge on his complete-information setup. Static
public-provision games like Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) argue similarly.
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in this paper incorporates more dimensions as there are multiple players and continuous-type
distributions, so the influence of ex-ante asymmetry highly depends on its definition and the
parametrization. Informed by the insight that the strongest type has a decisive influence on the
outcome, I manage to provide a complete discussion by considering two kinds of asymmetries,
one of which allows the strongest type to change while the other controls it. Specifically, the
first way of introducing asymmetry is to make the strongest type stronger under certain control,
whereas the other is to fix this type and make others weaker. Such a division constitutes a
complete discussion and both cases generate distinct insights. Thus, it is reasonable enough to
help us to understand the effect of asymmetries under different circumstances.
The result for the first kind of asymmetry shows that by strengthening the strongest, any
slight introduction of asymmetry reduces the cost of delay. I conduct numerical experiments to
show that for a large number of applications, the phrase above “slight introduction of asymme-
try” can be expanded to “any introduction of asymmetry”. The intuition is consistent with the
previous finding that the strongest type has a decisive influence on the outcome.
Nonetheless, the other case manifests dependence on parametrization. Any introduction
of asymmetry improves efficiency if the cost of symmetry is positive, which is measured by
the welfare-level discrepancy between an N -player symmetric game and the associated infinite-
player symmetric game, while asymmetry always impairs efficiency if the thus measured cost of
symmetry is negative. An explanation for this dichotomy is that the cost of symmetry defined
above actually evaluates the cost brought by increasing population and since asymmetry makes
the scale of active players smaller during the beginning period, the effect of asymmetry has the
same sign as that of the cost of symmetry.
This paper is organized as the following. Section 2 describes the model setup and the equilib-
rium concept. Section 3 first characterizes the equilibrium and proves the existence and unique-
ness. I introduce a special case, AD war, in this section to illustrate both behavior features
and welfare implications formally discussed later. Finally, this section performs comparative
statics. Section 4 shows the relationship between ex-ante asymmetry and social welfare. Section
5 discusses possible applications and differentiates from the related research.
2 Model
There is an indivisible public good potentially beneficial to N different individuals. I denote
each player by i ∈ IN where IN = {1, 2, ..., N}. A continuous-time war of attrition that requires
one exit begins at t = 0 and each player chooses a stopping time when, if no one has provided
the public good yet, he will provide. Since there is no dynamic interaction during the procedure,
this game is strategically static.
The information structure: one player, say i, knows exactly the cost of his individual provision
ci > 0, the rate ri > 0 at which he exponentially discounts his expected gain, and his valuation of
this public good vi. The costs and discount rates of all players are common knowledge, whereas
each valuation vi is private information independently extracted from a cumulative distribution
function Fi : [vi, vi] → [0, 1] in which vi < ci < vi < +∞ and ci > 0 for all i. Assume that each
Fi yields a density function fi : [vi, vi] → R
+ which is differentiable and strictly bounded from 0.
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Note that the strict relationship of vi, vi, and ci is important because it necessarily guarantees
the uniqueness of equilirium. For convenience, I sometimes call player i with valuation vi simply
as player vi.
Player i’s pure strategy is a function Ti : [vi, vi] → R
+ ∪ {0,+∞} referring to the stopping
time that player vi chooses. Only when no provision happens before Ti(vi) will this player
provide at this moment. If some players provide first, all players gain their valuations while the
providers additionally pay their share of the provision cost. Namely, if m ≥ 1 players provide
at this moment, they respectively pay 1
m
of the cost associated with each of them. If all players
choose to wait forever, each earns zero. All payoffs are lump-sum paid at the provision menment,
at which the game ends.
I consider pure-strategy Bayesian equilibrium, and in the following sections by equilibrium I
refer to this notion unless otherwise specified.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, I first show a set of sufficient and necessary conditions which reveal that the
equilibrium behavior demonstrates a stratified behavior pattern. Then, I prove the existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium. Moreover, I introduce a widely applicable case, AD war, to illustrate
some significant behavior and welfare insights which are formally discussed later. Finally, I
perform comparative statics.
3.1 Characterization
I introduce some definitions and notations before presenting the set of sufficient and necessary
conditions. First, I formulate the expected gain of player vi with his choice of stopping time being
ti and the strategies of other players fixed as {Tj(.); j 6= i}. For convenience, I denote the proba-
bility of at least one of the other players providing before t by Fmin−i (t) = Prob(minj 6=i Tj(vj) ≤ t).




e−risdFmin−i (s) + (vi − ci)e
−riti(1− Fmin−i (ti)) (1)
The first term above represents the case where someone else provides before ti, and the second
corresponds to the situation where no one provides before ti and thus player i pays the cost.
I omit the simultaneous-provision situation in (1) since this cannot appear in equilibrium, as
proved later. Further, define di = minv∈[vi,vi] Ti(v) as the minimal waiting time among all types
of player i, and ui = minTi(vi)=di vi as the minimal type of player i that provides at di.
The set of sufficient and necessary conditions presented below in Lemma 1 shows a strictly
decreasing monotonicity, which means that the higher one values the public good, the shorter
he will wait before concession. Besides, the asymmetric environment requires a set of flexible
boundary conditions, that is for every player i:
(vi − ui)di = 0, vi − ui ≥ 0, and di ≥ 0.
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If player i is such that vi > ui and di = 0, then by monotonicity, he will provide the public
good instantly when his valuation is higher than ui. I call him an instant-exit player. On the
other hand, if his equilibrium behavior satisfies vi = ui and di > 0, no matter what his valuaion
is, he will wait strictly until di when his highest type starts to contribute. In this case, he is a
strict-waiting player.9 Finally, player i is called an active player at moment t if there exists some
vi ∈ [vi, vi] such that Ti(vi) = t, which means that he is anticipated to have a positive probability
of provision around this moment. Now, I present the set of conditions for an equilibrium:
Lemma 1 A profile {Tj(.); j ∈ IN} corresponds to a Bayesian equilibrium if and only if:
(i) For all i ∈ IN , Ti(vi) = +∞ on [vi, ci], and Ti(vi) < +∞ on (ci, vi].
(ii) For all i ∈ IN , limvi→ci+0 Ti(vi) = +∞.
(iii) There are at most N − 2 strict-waiting players.
(iv) There is at most one instant-exit player.
(v) For all i ∈ IN , Ti(vi) is continuous and strictly decreasing on (ci, ui]. Thus, Ti(vi)’s inverse
function Φi(ti) exists on [di,+∞) and is also continuous and strictly decreasing.
(vi) At every moment t > 0, if there are M active players, denoted by I(t) = {j1, j2, ..., jM},




















Proof of Lemma 1 See appendix.
The clauses (iii), (iv), and (vi) of Lemma 1 together demonstrate an intriguing feature of the
asymmetric equilibrium involving multiple players: the war of attrition starts with a positive
probability of one player’s instant exit, which is followed by a period during which only two
players have the probability of concession, and this two-player period ends with the start of a
three-player period. Likewise, players leave the inactive state sequentially as the game proceeds
so that after a sufficiently long time, everyone becomes active.
To have a visual impression, consider three players with an information structure asymmetric
enough to make both instant exit and strict waiting possible. I denote the strict-waiting player
by 1 and his minimal waiting time by d1. Assume that three players have identical provision
costs. Then, I depict a possible solution of this three-player war in Figure 1.
I introduce some definitions and notations for convenience. I call a strict-waiting time poins
as a division, like the d1 in Figure 1, and the inverse function of each player’s strategy as a curve,
like the Φs in Figure 1. I denote the time interval between two adjacent divisions where there
are M active players by Υ(M) and call the group of differential equations that characterizes the
9The case where vi = ui and di = 0 is the same as the behavior demonstrated in a symmetric game, so it is
of less interest here.
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Figure 1: Player 3’s behavior, Φ3(t), starts at Φ3(0) = u3 < v3 corresponding to an instant exit, while that of
player 1, Φ1(t), remains inactive until d1 referring to a strict waiting. Before and after d1, the active curves obey
the two-player and three-player versions of (2), respectively, and they are continuous at d1.
behavior of these players during this interval the M problem, whose boundary conditions need
to be further specified. Let IM denote the set of active players in the M problem.
Importantly, the presence of instant exit and strict waiting discloses the relative strength
of incentives faced by different types of players. The key is that the information revelation
through time makes the types revealed at the same time mutually balance each other’s incentive.
Formally, rearranging (2) generates (3) which shows the tradeoff faced by the active player ji at






= rjidt(Φji(t)− cji) (3)
The interpretation of (3) is based on the facts that: a) Φji(t) is the type revealed at t, and thus
rjidt(Φji(t)− cji) represents how much this type will gain extra if he provides at t instead of at
t+dt; and b) Fjk(Φjk(t)) equals the probability of player jk’s providing after t, so the left side of
(3) represents the extra gain from an infinitesimal delay after t. So, individual optimality requires
that types revealed simultaneously make each other indifferent between providing and waiting
at their revelation moment. In other words, they mutually balance each other’s incentive, and
intuitively, I call these types equivalent in their incentive positions. For example, the instant-
exit types have the highest incentive position, since they value the public good so much that no
simultaneous revelation with others can offset their high incentive. And, between each pair of
adjacent divisions, even the highest type of an inactive player generates the incentive too low
to balance those of the active types. Thus, the revelation through time offers a natural way to
compare and rank the different types of different players.
That asymmetry affects the equilibrium by changing the scale of active players shares the
similar idea with Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), who develop a complete-information
model without timing. They find that considerable redistribution can make the incentives faced
by different players change so differently that the number of contributors of the provision of
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public goods will decrease. Further, my model incorporates the incomplete information and
timing, both of which make this scale-changing process endogenous.
Hereafter, a type is called stronger than another if the former type selects a shorter waiting
time, or if the former values the public good more than the latter when they are both instant-exit
types. Likewise, a player is stronger than another if the highest type of the former strictly waits
shorter, or if he is an instant-exit player.
3.2 Existence and Uniqueness
I apply a perturbation strategy to guarantee a unique equilibrium. Specifically, every player has
a positive probability of valuing the public good less than his cost or, formally, with Fi(ci) > 0.
The intuition is that the probability of never conceding makes the arrival of any moment possible,
which imposes perfection on all the off-equilibrium paths to eliminate unreasonable solutions.
To determine the equilibrium, I employ a backward induction strategy. The first step is to
consider the last M problem where all N players are active.
Now, I define the PN problem. Recall that the N problem refers to the N -player version of (2)
defined on [d,+∞) where d denotes the largest strict-waiting time. Since (2) is time-invariant,
we can substitute t + d for t so that the rightmost division d becomes the new origin of time.
Then, I extend the definition of both Fi(.) and fi(.) to the domain (vi,+∞) for every player i.
The form of this extension is such that both functions remain entirely differentiable and bounded
from both infinity and zero. Clearly, such an extension exists and with it, the N problem still
satisfies local Lipschitz condition wherever it has definition. Further, define BN = ×
N
i=1[ci,+∞),
and I call m ∈ BN a left-side boundary selection which generates {(0,mi); i ∈ IN} as a set
of boundary conditions at t = 0 for the N problem. The satisfaction of Lipschitz condition
implies that every boundary selection yields a unique solution of the N problem, so we can
denote by Φi(t,m) the curve of player i associated with the boundary selection m. Finally, I call
PN = {IN , BN , (ci, ri, Fi, fi),Φi(t,m); i ∈ IN} the PN problem, which consists of the N problem
with the origin reset at d, the set of all possible left-side boundary selections, and the set of
solution curves written as functions of both the time and the boundary selection.
According to Lemma 1(ii) and (v), a boundary selectionm∗ of the PN problem that yields the
equilibrium-like solution of the N problem should be such that every solution curve i, Φi(t,m
∗),
is strictly decreasing and convergent to ci with respect to t. Besides, the clauses (iii) and (iv)
also require a “just-touch” condition: m∗i ≤ vi for all player i while m
∗
k = vk for some player k,
in which such and only such player ks strictly wait till the arrival of the N problem.
To prove that such a boundary selection uniquely exists, I first show several properties of the
solution curves of the PN problem, which are summarized in Lemma 2. This lemma shows that:
a) each solution curve is monotonous with respect to each component of the boundary selection;
and b) when the solution is convergent such that each curve converges to a finite number, it must
satisfy Lemma 1(ii) and (v); and finally, c) any variation of one component of the boundary
selection makes the convergence collapse to divergence.
Lemma 2 For the PN problem defined above, its solution curves have:
(i) Monotonicity: for all t > 0, m ∈ BN , and i, j ∈ IN such that j 6= i, Φi(t,m) is strictly
increasing with respect to mi, while strictly decreasing with respect to mj.
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(ii) Two patterns: when t → +∞, the solution can take on convergence: it satisfies Lemma
1(ii) and (v); or divergence: Φi approximates +∞ or vi for all k ∈ IN .
(iii) Sensitivity: for all m ∈ BN , and i, j ∈ IN such that j 6= i, if the solution is convergent,
then as t→ +∞, ∂Φi(t,m)/∂mi → +∞, while ∂Φj(t,m)/∂mi → −∞.
Proof of Lemma 2 See appendix.
Lemma 2 indicates that solution uniqueness hinges on the perturbation condition that vi < ci
for all i. This condition makes the solution that satisfies Lemma 1(ii) and (v) the only convergent
solution of the PN problem, and also makes it sensitive to the boundary seletion. To observe
the multiplicity problem of the opposite case, consider a 2-player problem in which v1 > c1
and v2 > c2, and in the associated P2 problem, B2 = [v1,+∞) × [v2,+∞). First, there exist
degenerate equilibria in which all types of one player provide instantly. Additionally, multiplicity
also occurs even if the equilibrium is selected according to Lemma 110, since for both i = 1, 2
and all m ∈ B2, (2) always gives that Φ
′
i(t,m) ≤ −(vi − ci)Fi(Φi)/fi(Φi) < 0, which naturally
satisfies Lemma 1(ii) and (v).
Now, I summarize the backward induction process with which I prove the existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium. Lemma 2(ii) tells that to find an equilibrium-like solution of the PN
problem, it suffices to find a boundary selection that generates a convergent solution and also
satisfies the “just touch” condition. First, for every constant m0 ≥ c1, I show that the boundary
selection that has m1 = m0 and generates a convergent solution uniquely exists. To prove so, I
utilize the sensitivity property in Lemma 2(iii) to show that if the set of such boundary selections
described above is nonempty and compact, then this set contains a unique element. Next, I
construct a sequence of auxiliary functions such that the limit points of the sequence of their
fixed points are exactly the boundary selections we want, and I prove that this set of limit points
is nonempty and compact. Therefore, we can rewrite the unique boundary selection associated
with m1 = m0 ≥ c1 as N well-defined functions, {mi(m0); i ∈ IN}. Second, I show that for every
i ∈ IN mi(c1) = ci and mi(.) is strictly increasing and continuous. All these properties together






“just touch” condition that ci ≤ mi(m
∗
0) ≤ vi for all player i while mk(m
∗
0) = vk for some player
k. Now, consider the penultimate M problem defined on the time interval Υ(M). Note that
any player k such that m∗k = vk is no longer active in this problem, and since a set of boundary
conditions that generates a unique solution on Υ(M) is already set on the right-side division by
the m∗ solution of the PN problem, the only thing to determine is the relative distance between
the left-side and the right-side divisions, that is the length of Υ(M). I show that the strictly
decreasing monotonicity of the solution curves of the PN problem implies that this property still
holds on Υ(M), and this yields a unique length of Υ(M) such that all active curves satisfy the
“just touch” condition on the left-side division. Likewise, the backward sequential satisfaction
of “just touch” determines the relative distance between each pair of adjacent divisions and also
gradually reduces the number of active players. This process stops when the active population
decreases to either zero or one, which corresponds to an equilibrium without or with one instant-
exit player, respectively. Whereby, I finally obtain the main result of this section:
10Here, clause (ii) should be modified to be: for all i, limvi→vi+0 Ti(vi) = +∞.
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Theorem 1 There uniquely exists a Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 1 See appendix.
I introduce some notations to link a war of attrition game to its unique equilibrium. Define
Ω as the set of all proper wars of attrition, where by proper I mean that if ω ∈ Ω, then it
can be written as ω = {N, (ri, ci, Fi, vi, vi); i ∈ IN} parametrized as in Section 2. On the
other hand, define Ξ as the set of the unique equilibria of all such proper games, and for every
e = {N,K,Φi, (dK ,MK , IK); i ∈ IN , K ∈ IK = {1, 2, ..., K}} ∈ Ξ, N ≥ 2 and K ≥ 0, and for all
i ∈ IN Φi(.) denotes the inverse of player i’s equilibrium strategy, and for all K ∈ IK dK marks
the location of the Kth division from the left whereas d0 = 0 and dK+1 = +∞, and IK and
MK denote the set of active players and the number of them during t ∈ (dK , dK+1), respectively.
Finally, I define the mapping E : Ω → Ξ such that E(ω) is the unique equilibrium of ω.
3.3 An Important Case: AD War
To demonstrate some behavior and welfare insights, I introduce a special yet significant family
of proper wars, aligned-distribution war (AD war). This class of war is important for two
reasons: a) apart from this case, there are very few mathematically tractable examples and b)
it corresponds to wide economic applications.
In each AD war, players have identical costs and dicount rates, but their valuation distribu-
tions are all lower-conditional distributions of one fixed distribution with different upper bounds.
Formally, let F be a proper distribution whose upper bound and lower bound are denoted by v
and v, respectively, and (vi)
N
i=1 a set containing N players’ upper bounds, each of which is no
greater than v and greater than the provision cost. Then, the ith player’s valuation distribution
is the lower-conditional distribution of F corresponding to vi, that is, Fi(v) = F (v|v ≤ vi) for
all i. Define ΩAD ⊂ Ω as the space of all such wars, and each of its element is denoted by
ωAD = {N, r, c, F, v, (vi)i}. From now on, I will sometimes call such a war of attrition an AD
war generated from distribution F with upper bounds (vi)
n
i=1.
This case corresponds to a large category of daily-life scenarios because it can be seen as a
partly revealed symmetric war in which players who are initially anticipated to be symmetric
may have engaged in some previous games whose unequal outcomes shape the asymmetry of the
current war.11 On the other hand, an AD war is easy to analyze, for the rates on the right side
of (2), fi(v)/Fi(v), of different players are identical on their overlap domain, so between each
adjacent pair of divisions active players’ behavior is characterized by symmetric equations, and
it is easy to verify that backward induction gives symmetric solution12.
First, I demonstrate how the equilibrium of an AD war looks like. Without loss of generality,
let v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vN > c > v. Note that the active curves on each Υ(M) are symmetric.
11One should see this interpretation as merely intuitive. It needs the assumption that the decision a player
made in a previous game is not strategically related to other games, for example, when the interval between
games is so large that exponential discounting makes any such inter-game strategic move worthless.
12The proof of Theorem 1 suggests the uniqueness of the rightmost PN problem’s solution, which requires the
solution characterized by symmetric equations to be symmetric as well. This rightmost symmetry further ensures
symmetric boundary conditions on all domains on its left side, and therefore the symmetric equations on each
domain also result in symmetric solution.
11
Formally, let ΦAD(t|M, r, c, F, u, v) denote the solution of the initial-value problem derived from
the symmetric M -player version of (2) with boundary condition ΦAD(0|M, r, c, F, u, v) = u.
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Then, the equilibrium E(wAD) is given by:
d0 = 0, dK+1 = +∞
dK − dK−1 = Φ
−1
AD(vK+2|K + 1, r, c, vK+1, v), K = 1, 2, ..., N − 2{
T1(v) = 0, v ∈ (v2, v1]
Φ1(t) = ... = Φn(t) = ΦAD(t− dn−2|n, r, c, vn, v), t ∈ [dn−2, dn−1), n = 2, 3, ..., N
(4)
The tractability of this case depends on the behavior feature of local symmetry, that is, types
with identical numerical value provide at the same time. In this case, the ranking of incentive
positions coincides with that of valuations, which gives a straightforward interpretation of the
former. In Figure 2, I depict the solution of a three-player AD war.
Figure 2: This figure demonstrates the equilibrium of a three-player AD war. The player with the highest
upper bound provides instantly when his realized type is no less than the second-large upper bound. Before
the first division two players are active, whereas after it the third becomes active as well. Active players always
reveal their types symmetrically at the same time.
Another noteworthy feature is that players’ behavior is asymmetrically dependent on each
other. Namely, if the upper bound of a weak player varies, all stronger types’ behavior stays
unchanged, while if that of a strong player changes, all weaker types alternate their decisions.
More formally, consider N players in an AD war and one of them, say k who is not the strongest
player, has distribution upper bound vk. Now, let his and only his upper bound rise (or drop)
to ṽk to construct a new game. Then, for all players, any type greater than max{vk, ṽk} chooses
the same stopping time as in the old game, whereas any type less than max{vk, ṽk} chooses a
longer (or shorter) waiting time. The strongest player may seem like an exception because the
variation of his upper bound only changes his probability of instant exit, but one should notice
13Namely, ΦAD(t|M, r, c, F, u, v) is the solution of Φ
′





f(Φ) (Φ−c) with boundary condition Φ(0) =
u.
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that this lowers all lower types’ incentive positions by directly adding strong types at the top of
the ranking.
This result demonstrates the dominant position of the strongest player in determining the
incentive ranking, because any variation of a weaker player’s distribution mainly changes his
strict-waiting time to suit this ranking, while any variation of the strongest player changes the
ranking directly.
This saliency of the strongest player further implies his dominant position in the determi-
nation of welfare level. On the one hand, the parameter change of the strongest player sheds
consistent influence on all types’ incentive positions. On the other, the influence of a weak
player’s change is offset14 due to the fact that the behavior alternation of those valuing the
public good less than him is in the opposite direction of the change of his incentive position.
Namely, when this weak player’s upper bound rises (or drops), types lower than him delay longer
(or shorter) and thus the welfare change out of this is moderate.
A surprising result is that it is the strongest player’s highest type, rather than his exact
behavior, that mainly determines a society’s welfare level. This is at odds with the idea men-
tioned in the literature that asymmetry changes welfare by making some players concede sooner
or later. For example, Kambe (2019) argued that a higher probability of instant exit necessar-
ily improves efficiency. Others, like Myatt (2005), also stressed the importance of instant exit.
However, Proposition 1 below shows a telling example that refutes such a statement since in
this case, the welfare level becomes completely irrelevant to how players exactly behave as long
as the strongest type is fixed.
Now, I use the uniform-distribution example to show the insight on welfare discussed above. I
call this example the aligned-uniform-distribution war (AUD war) which has analytical solution.
I let ΦAUD(t|M, r, c, u, v) = ΦAD(t|M, r, c, F, u, v) which is given by:







Above λ = 1 − (c − v)/(v − v) and ρ = 1 − v/c, and sometimes I simply denote this curve by
ΦAUD(t|M,λ), for other parameters are shared by all players in the same AUD war. Combining
(4) and (5), one obtains the equilibrium.
I see the expectation of a decreasing exponential function with respect to stopping time,
Etm [e
−ρrt]15 where ρ is defined above, as a measure of welfare level. One important property of
AUD war is that in equilibrium this measure is only determined by the maximal upper bound.
Therefore, it is unaffected by the variation of population and other players’ upper bounds, both of
which necessarily determine how each type will behave. I present it in the following proposition:
14As shown later in Proposition 1 and Theorem 4, the extent of this offset depends on parametrization and
can be either partial, excessive, or complete.
15A more reasonable measure of welfare level is Etm [e
−rt] which I will use for analysis in Section 3, since if
some player, say vi, values the public good less than his cost and thus he chooses to wait forever, he earns an
expected gain viEtm [e
−rt]. However, the economic insight here is not sensitive to this bias brought by the shrunk
power, as e−ρrt is still monotonous with respect to stopping time t.
13







ρ = 1−v/c, and Etm [.] calculates the expectation with respect to stopping time under equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1 First, I show that this lemma holds in symmetric case. Let vi = v
for all i. Then, (5) and (4) give that the symmetric solution Φ(t) = ΦAUD(t|N, λ), where



































Above, the second-last step substitutes u for 1 − λe−
1
N−1
ρrt, and the last step calculates the
integration by parts16. This concludes the first part of the proof.
Next, I prove that this lemma holds for any 2-group AUD war. A 2-group AUD war involves
two kinds of individuals with upper bounds v1 and v2, respectively, whose associated uniform
distribution functions are denoted by F1(.) and F2(.). Without loss of generality, let v1 >
v2. Let the number of the first group be n, and thus the population of the second group is
N − n. (5) and (4) give that there is one division, denoted by t∗, and that on (0, t∗) exist the n
identical strategy curves of the players in the first group, denoted by Φ1(t) = ΦU(t|n, λ1), and on
(t∗,+∞) exist the N identical curves of all players, denoted by Φ2(t) = ΦU(t− t
∗|N, λ2), where
λi = 1 − (c − v)/(vi − v) for i = 1, 2. Continuity of solution requires that e
−ρrt∗ = (λ2/λ1)
n−1.





































































Int(N − 1). Boundary condition Int(1) = (1− λ)/λ gives Int(N) = N( λ1−λ )
N .
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The last two steps above borrow the results of the first part of the proof.
Finally, I use the propositions proved in the previous two steps to conduct mathematical
induction to prove the lemma for any AUD war. Let e = {N,K,Φ, (dK ,MK)K} denote the
equilibrium of an AUD war, and λK = 1 − (c − v)/(Φ(dK) − v) for all K. Obviously, by the
first proposition proved above, Etm [e
−ρrt|tm ≥ dK ] = λK because the subgame on [dK ,+∞) is
a symmetric N -player AUD war with upper bound Φ(dK). And I conduct induction from the
rightmost division to t = 0: if for K such that 0 < K ≤ K we have Etm [e
−ρrt|tm ≥ dK ] = λK ,
then Etm [e
−ρrt|tm ≥ dK−1] = λK−1, which is ensured by the second proposition proved above.
Consequently, Etm [e
−ρrt|tm ≥ 0] = Etm [e
−ρrt] = λ1.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 favors the statement that the strongest player determines the welfare level by
ranking all types’ incentive positions, instead of providing directly by himself. In this case, the
effect of any rise (or drop) of a weak player’s upper bound is completely offset by the longer
(or shorter) provision time of all types lower than him. Therefore, the arbitrary change of weak
players’ behavior that results from different selections of their upper bounds does not affect
welfare level, and it is the incentive ranking decided by the fixed strongest type that essentially
decides this level. Another insight shown by Proposition 1 is that the loss out of delay always
occurs because the expectation of e−ρrt is strictly less than one. The exception is the case where
some players’ upper bound is unbounded from infinity. Section 3.1 revisits these insights.
3.4 Comparative Statics
In this subsection, I perform some comparative statics on the equilibrium. I first compare the
behavior of different players in the same war conditional on some relationship between their
parameters. Specifically, I investigate how the difference between costs, discount rates, and
revelation rates affects the relative provision time of two players. Here, revelation rate refers to
f(.)/F (.), the density of the type being revealed conditional on the revelation of all types above
it. The interpretation of this rate will be discussed later. Now I present this result:
Proposition 2 Consider an N-player proper war, say ω ∈ Ω, if there exists a pair of players,
denoted by α, β ∈ IN whose solution curves both exist on [t0,+∞), parametrized such that:
(i) rα = rβ, cα = cβ = c, and fα(v)/Fα(v) T fβ(v)/Fβ(v) on their overlap domain, then
Φα(t) S Φβ(t) for all t ∈ [t0,+∞).
(ii) rα = rβ, fα(v)/Fα(v) = fβ(v)/Fβ(v) on their overlap domain, and cα ≷ cβ, then Φα(t) ≷
Φβ(t) for all t ∈ [t0,+∞).
(iii) cα = cβ = c, fα(v)/Fα(v) = fβ(v)/Fβ(v) on their overlap domain, and rα ≷ rβ, then
Φα(t) ≶ Φβ(t) for all t ∈ [t0,+∞).
Proof of Proposition 2 See appendix.
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The last two clauses of Proposition 2 convey straightforward intuitions: higher cost reduces
the gain of provision and thus leads to a delayed strategy, while higher discount rate corre-
sponding to impatience increases the opportunity cost of waiting so that player tends to provide
sooner.
However, the interpretation of the first clause associated with revelation rate is unclear,
because under different assumptions this result generates different economic outcomes. For
example, if player α’s and β’s upper bounds are set to be equal, Proposition 2(i) indicates that
the player with consistently higher revelation rate stands in a relatively higher incentive position.
In contrast, if two players’ probability of valuation being lower than cost is set to be equal, the
one with consistently lower revelation rate becomes stronger17.
This discrepancy between these two cases must result from the different economic interpreta-
tions of the revelation-rate domination under different settings. In the first case, this domination
is equivalent to subjecting higher probability to higher valuations. So, the dominated player
tends to anticipate the other to face higher opportunity cost of waiting and thus in average to
provide sooner, and this belief leads to the free-riding of the former, which in turn forces the
high-revelation-rate player actually to provide sooner. In the second case, when the probability
of waiting forever is controlled, the revelation-rate domination requires the dominant player’s
distribution to have a greater upper bound than that of the other, and these salient types value
the public good so much that they stand in a higher incentive position.
4 Asymmetry and Social Welfare
In this section, I investigate how ex-ante asymmetry influences the welfare outcome of a war
of attrition. First, by considering large-population societies, I discuss the different roles played
by different members in the determination of social welfare. Next, I argue that under different
conditions, the introduction of asymmetry can affect efficiency either positively or negatively.
4.1 Asymmetric Contribution
To make analysis tractable, I follow the seminal work by Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) where they
discussed a large-population symmetric war of attrition. This subsection derives the counterpart
conclusion of their limit theorem for my asymmetric war. However, my objective differs from
theirs in that I intend to answer how differently do unequally positioned individuals contribute
to social welfare.
I introduce some definitions and notations.A society is divided if it consists of multiple het-
erogeneous groups, and in each group, all members are (ex ante) homogeneous. Formally, define
s = {N,L, (pι, rι, cι, Fι, vι)ι} to represent an N -member divided society which faces a proper
war of attrition. This society is divided into L different groups, and the ιth group takes up pι
17If α has a consistently higher revelation rate, then Φα(t) < Φβ(t) for all t ∈ [t0,+∞) which gives





(Φβ(s) − Φα(s))ds > 0. This further implies that when Φα reaches its
upper bound, Φβ must be lower than its upper bound and therefore β is stronger.
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proportion of the total population and
∑L
ι=1 pι = 1. Each member in the ιth group is symmet-
rically parametrized by {cι, rι, Fι, vι}. The rules of notation are the same as those introduced in
Section 2.2 only differing in that L denotes the total number of groups and subscript ι denotes
all groups. For simplicity, all divided societies considered in this subsection consist of members
who have identical provision costs and discount rates, respectively denoted by c and r, while
their valuation distributions may differ from each other.
To begin with, I prove a useful lemma:
Lemma 3 Consider a divided society parametrized by s = {N,L, r, c, (pι, Fι, fι, vι)ι} which
yields an aligned equilibrium: there is no instant exit or strict waiting, and thus Φι(0) = vι
for all ι. Then, when N becomes sufficiently large (while maintaining the equilibrium aligned):
(i) To maintain alignment, all upper bounds must be the same, namely, vι = v for all ι.
(ii) A player with valuation v earns expected gain v(1− c/
∑L
k=1 pkvk) = v(1− c/v).
Proof of Lemma 3 I first prove the second clause. Let nι = pιN be the population of the ιth




k=1 nk(Φk(t)− c), and









By the equation above, Φ
′
ι(t) → 0 as N → ∞, which means the stopping time chosen by members
increases to infinity when the population grows large, thus the second term of (1) vanishes in
the limit case while the first term approximates the product of the valuation and the expected
discount factor, Etm [e
−rt], defined in Proposition 1. Therefore, any player’s expected gain in the
limit case is determined by this expected discount factor. To calculate the expected discount
factor, I first derive the distribution of the stopping time, Fmin, and the associated density, fmin:






















































































The third-last step utilizes g(t) = N
N−1
∑L





k=1 pkvk − c). On the other
































































−rt] ≤ 1 − c
∑L
k=1 pkvk, must give the limit value Etm [e
−rt] → 1 − c
∑L
k=1 pkvk.
Consequently, for a player with valuation v, his limit expected gain is v(1− c/
∑L
k=1 pkvk).



















Combining this approximation and the fact that each term on the left is negative, we have
Φ
′
k(t) → 0−0 for all k, with which each player’s differential equation further gives that vι− c→
g(0) at t = 0 for all ι, and note that vι = c+ g(0) = v, which proves (i) and completes (ii).
Q.E.D.
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And I present the symmetric version of Lemma 3 which is equivalent to Bliss and Nalebuff’s
(1984) Theorem 6:
Corollary 1 Consider a symmetric N-player war parametrized by ω = {N, c, v}. When N
becomes sufficiently large, the expected gain of player v approximates R(v) = v(1− c/v).
The condition of an aligned equilibrium in Lemma 3 simplifies the proof by only considering
a society whose each group shares the same incentive position. This lemma gives three insightful
results: a) when population grows large, the welfare level is solely determined by the strongest
types and the population proportions associated with these types; and b) a group’s highest type
is representative of the incentive position of this group; and finally, c) no matter how large the
population grows, inefficiency always occurs, unless some groups subject positive probability to
the extreme type with infinite valuation.
The proof of Lemma 3 provides more information. First, all possible provision is realized
immediately at the beginning of the war of attrition, almost surely. But why inefficiency still
occurs given this instant provision? This is because when the population grows large, any type
below the upper-bound type tends to free ride for a sufficiently long time so that only those in an
almost-zero-measure set very close to the upper bound actually contribute and the probability
of everyone’s not providing at t = 0 remains considerable. Consequently, the distribution of
stopping time subjects all of the probability to two events: either someone provides instantly,
or nobody provides within finite time.
For a better understanding of the relationship between upper bound and incentive position
in this limit case which is implied by Lemma 3(i), I present a complementary lemma:
Lemma 4 Consider a divided society parametrized by s = {N,L, r, c, (pι, Fι, fι, vι)ι}. Then,
when N becomes sufficiently large, the strict-waiting times of different groups have the relation-
ship that Tι1(vι1) S Tι2(vι2) if and only if vι1 T vι2 for all ι1 and ι2.
Proof of Lemma 4 Suppose at some moment, say t0, there are M > 1 active groups whose
subscripts are denoted by ι ∈ IM = {1, 2, ...,M}. Further, suppose Φι(t0) for all ι are not
identical, which indicates the existence of some ι∗ ∈ IM such that Φι∗(t0) >
∑L
k=1 pkΦk(t0).
Summing up both sides of the differential equations of all players in these M groups, we have
Φ
′
ι∗(t) → 0−0, similar to the proof of Lemma 3(i). However, this gives that dlnFι∗(Φι∗(t0))/dt =
(r/c)(Φι∗(t0) − g(t0)) → (r/c)(Φι∗(t0) −
∑L
k=1 pkΦk(t0)) > 0, an absurdity. Thus, the values of
the strategy curves of the groups active at the same moment must be identical.
For sufficiency, consider two groups with different upper bounds, respectively denoted by
vι1 > vι2 . Then, denote the strcit-waiting times of both groups respectively by t1 and t2, and
the time when Φι1(t) equals v2 by t12, the existence of which is ensured by vι1 > vι2 . Since Φι1(.)
is decreasing and continuous, t12 > t1, and by the conclusion proved in the previous paragragh,
t12 = t2, and therefore we have t1 < t2. The proof of necessity is only an inverse process.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 4 corresponds to the asymmetric-dependence behavior feature stressed in Section
3.3. Specifically, the variation of one player’s upper bound will not influence the behavior of
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types higher than him while those lower than this upper bound will change to wait infinitely
longer than his provision time. At every moment, the highest type in this society will provide
instantly with positive probability, while any distribution-wise variation of lower types will not
at all change the outcome. This is another demonstration of how the strongest type determines
the welfare level in addition to the special case considered in Section 3.3.
What is curious is that the results given by Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 are irrelevant to the
shapes of distribution functions or even the density of the highest type. The explanation lies
in that, when the population grows large, the law of large numbers ensures that the types with
either large or small density will occur homogeneously with probability one, and because of this,
the variation of the density subjected to valuations becomes less important.
The insights of the previous two lemmas are summarized in the following theorem which
characterizes the level of expected welfare of a large-population divided society at every moment
after the war of attrition begins:
Theorem 2 Consider a divided society parametrized by s = {N,L, r, c, (pι, Fι, fι, vι)ι}. Then,
when N becomes sufficiently large, for all τ ≥ 0, Etm [e
−rt|t ≥ τ ] is solely determined by the
highest type anticipated at the moment τ . Specifically, denote this highest anticipation at τ by
v(τ), and the expected welfare calculated at τ of a member with valuation v is v(1− c/v(τ)).
Proof of Theorem 2 This is a corollary of Lemma 3 and Lemma 4.
4.2 The Welfare Effect of Asymmetry
In this section, I discuss the effect that introducing asymmetry has on efficiency in different
cases. I do this by considering two ways of introducing asymmetry: a) to make the strongest
player stronger under the control that the expectation of the sum of players’ valuations is fixed;
and b) to fix the strongest player and make others weaker. As mentioned in the introduction,
such division constitutes a complete discussion.
I use AD war for discussion to simplify analysis while preserving generality.18 Besides, I
measure the welfare level with the expected discount factor19, Etm [e
−rt], the expectation of a
decreasing function of stopping time under equilibrium.
18Specific explanation. First, this family of wars of attrition is simple enough, since, on the one hand, the
local-symmetry property of equilibrium strategy makes the measure of welfare tractable, and on the other,
asymmetry is directly represented by the difference among players’ distribution upper bounds. Second, AD war
is generalized enough to be representative, because the dimension of information structure remains infinite as
the (proper) distribution from which each AD war is generated can be arbitrary.
19I apply this measure of welfare for two reasons. First, a player who values the public good less than the cost
he faces will wait forever, and thus his expected gain is exactly his valuation multiplying this expected discount
factor. Second, one minus this value should be seen as a justified cost of delay, for e−rt is directly related to
the delayed time and the exponential form measures how players undertake cost because of it. One thing to be
admitted is that the infinite-dimension information structure makes it difficult to find a direct measure of welfare.
However, literature always shifts the attention to the cost of delay, which makes it possible for discussion. Thus,
in this section by welfare level I mean one minus cost of delay and it should be seen as an intuitive, rather than
accurate, measure of welfare. The spirits follow Bliss and Nalebuff (1984), Alesina and Drazen (1991), Bulow and
Klemperer (1999), and Riley (1999), where the expectation of different functions of stopping time is considered.
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I recall and introduce some notations first. Consider an AD war parametrized by wAD =
{N, r, c, F, v, (vi)i}. Define function en(u) as the expected discount factor calculated under the
equilibrium of an n-player symmetric AD war generated from F with upper bound u, namely,
en(u) equals Etm [e
−rt] calculated under E(ωn(u)) where ωn(u) = {n, r, c, F, v, vi = u}. Denote
the symmetric equilibrium strategy that players choose in this game by Tn(v|u), and en(u) and
Tn(v|u) are given by:
















ds = (n− 1)T2(v|u)
(6)
Further, e∞(u) is defined as 1− c/u according to Theorem 2, and for simplicity T2(.|.) is written
as T (.|.) if there is no confounding.
As stated before, I first investigate the welfare implication of the introduction of asymmetry
that allows the strongest to change. To let different welfare levels be comparable, I consider
the symmetric game and the asymmetric games that have the same expected sum of valuations.
Similar to the prediction given by the last subsection, the theorem below shows that by making
the strongest player slightly stronger, asymmetric games always yield higher welfare levels than
the symmetric game.
Theorem 3 Consider a family of two-group AD wars in which each game is generated from
the same F (.). The first group consists of m ≥ 1 identical members with upper bound v1, while
the second has n ≥ 1 identical members with upper bound v2 ≤ v1. Both upper bounds can
change but under the control that the expectation of the sum of all players’ valuations is fixed,
namely mE[v1] + nE[v2] is constant. Let v0 > c be the common upper bound of the symmetric
game (where v1 = v2). Then, there exists a v
∗ ∈ (c, v0) such that all asymmetric games with
v2 ∈ [v
∗, v0) yield higher expected discount factor than the symmetric game with v2 = v0.
Proof of Theorem 3 For each (v1, v2), the expected discount factor calculated under the equi-






















du = C where C is constant. By differentiating










The equation above tells how the variations of both upper bounds are related to each other,
whereby ẽ can be written as ẽ(v1). To investigate how the welfare level is affected by the
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Above, η = e−r(m−1)T (v2|v1) F
m(v2)
Fm(v1)
































Now, consider the value of this derivative in the symmetric case where v1 = v2 = v0, which
implies ẽ = em+n(v2), e∞(v1) = e∞(v2), η = 1, and
v1−E[v1]
v2−E[v2]











Consequently, any slight upward variation of v1 from v0 or, equivalently, any slight downward
variation of v2 from v0 will increase the value of expected discount factor. Further, since ẽ
is continuous with respect to either v1 or v2, there must exist a v
∗ < v0 such that for all
v2 ∈ (v
∗, v0) the associated asymmetric game yields higher expected discount factor than that
by the symmetric game.
Q.E.D.
The intuition conveyed by Theorem 3 is straightforward: the strongest type “controls” the
behavior of all types and thus he has a decisive influence on the outcome, so the stronger he
becomes, the lower cost of delay tends to be. Particularly, when v1 moves slightly upwards from
v0, the second and the third terms in (8) completely offset each other, which corresponds to that
the increase of the second group’s stopping time out of the rise of v1 offsets the decrease out of
the drop of v2, and this leaves the positive first term which is purely caused by the rise of v1 to
be the only effect.
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One problem Theorem 3 must confront is how much the positive efficacy of asymmetry
relies on the slightness of its introduction or, equivalently, whether v∗ is closer to v0 than c or
not. Although the complexity of (8) implies that a clear answer might be unlikely, numerical
experiments on AUD wars suggest that v∗ → c always seems to hold, that is, for uniform-
distribution cases, any introduction of asymmetry under the control of the expected sum of
valuations improves efficiency. In the appendix, I demonstrate several examples and comment
on them.
More remarks on this theorem. First, the two-group setting can be relaxed to general cases
where there is a multi-player strongest group, and all other weaker players can have arbitrary
upper bounds. Theorem 3 still holds if it is restated to be: slightly splitting the strongest group
into two groups with controlling the expected sum of valuations always increases the expected




when v1 = v2, which is
reasonable, generate the same results as fixing the expected sum of valuations, for example,
controls like fixing the expected sum of upper bounds or fixing the value of FM(v1)F
N(v2).
Therefore, the positive efficacy of the first kind of asymmetry is quite robust.
Now, I investigate the effect of the introduction of asymmetry that controls the strongest
player. Unlike the previous case, the strong-strong symmetric game may yield either lower or
higher expected discount factor than the associated strong-weak asymmetric games. In other
words, the result depends on the parametrization. In the following theorem, I give the condition
for asymmetry either alleviating or aggravating cost of delay, and then I interpret its insight.
Theorem 4 Consider a family of N-player AD wars in which each game is generated from
the same F (.) and has identical maximal upper bound, namely maxi∈IN vi = vm where vm is
constant. Then, if eN(u)− e∞(u) is positive (or negative) for all u ∈ (c, vm], the symmetric AD
war where vi = vm for all i yields the lowest (or the highest) expected discount factor.
Proof of Theorem 4 I only show the proof of the case where eN(u) − e∞(u) is positive for
all u ∈ (c, vm], and that of the other can be similarly done. Without loss of generality, let
v1 = vm ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vN > c. I need to show that if eN(u) > e∞(u) for all u ∈ (c, vm], the
minimal expected discount factor is obtaind when all unequal signs above become equal.
To prove this, I first consider a two-group AD war (not necessaily a member of the family
defined in the theorem) generated also from F (.) where the first group contains M players with
the identical upper bound, v1, whereas the second contains N −M players with the identical
upper bound, u such that u ≤ v1 ≤ vm. Denote the expected discount factor calculated under
the equilibrium of this AD war by eM,N(v1, u). Then, by definition eM,N(v1, u) is equivalent to
ẽ(v1, v2) given in the proof of Theorem 3 but with m =M , n = N −M , and v2 = u. Let v1 be
controlled as constant, and by directly modifying the second partial derivative in (7), I give how
eM,N varies with respect to u:
∂eM,N
∂u









From above, it is easy to see that ∂eM,N(v1, u)/∂v2 < 0 for all u ∈ (c, v1], because eN(u) > e∞(u)
for all u ∈ (c, v1] as assumed. This result suggests that to get a lower expected discount factor
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under this two-group AD war is to increase the value of u, and the lowest expected discount is
obtained when this war degenerates to a one-group symmetric war, namely when u→ v1.
Now, suppose that the lowest expected discount factor of the AD war in Theorem 4 is obtaind
when v1 = vm ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vN in which at least one of the unequal signs is strict. Then, denote
the upper bound on the left side of the last of such strictly unequal signs by vM , and therefore the
N players do not all become active until playerM+1 becomes active. Denote the moment when
playerM becomes active by tM . However, there occurs a contradiction: the lemma proved above
indicates that the expected discount factor conditional on the arrival of tM , Etm [e
−rt|t ≥ tM ],
can be further reduced by increasing the upper bounds of playersM+1,M+2, ..., N to vM ; and
according to (4), this variation will not affect the equilibrium behavior during t ∈ [0, tM ], thus
the expected discount factor under the entire equilibrium is also reduced in this way. Therefore,
the game that yields the lowest expected discount factor can only be the symmetric game.
Q.E.D.
The term eN(u) − e∞(u) can be interpreted as a measure of the cost of symmetry since it
calculates the loss or gain brought by adding people to a symmetric game. If this term is positive
(or negative), then a larger population is worse (or better), and when asymmetry makes several
players become active sooner than others, the expected gain generated during the beginning
period with fewer players being active will rise (or drop), while the gain generated after that
will not be very different. Thus, Theorem 4 argues that when the cost of symmetry is positive
(or negative), any introduction of asymmetry improves (or impairs) efficiency.
The force that decides the sign of eN(u)− e∞(u) is two-sided: a) in an M -player symmetric
game each type’s decision isM−1 times the decision made by the same type in the associated 2-
player game, and this redoubled waiting time presents severer free riding which impairs efficiency;
and b) the potential probability of provision20, defined as the provision probability calculated in
the counterfactual world where every type valuing the public good higher than his cost provides
immediately (that is, a world without delay), is 1−FM(c) which is an increasing function of M ,
and the rise of this probability is potential to improve efficiency.
Numerical experiments on AUD war give examples satisfying either of the two conditions.
When the lower bound of the uniform distribution from which an AUD war is generated is
positive, the introduction of asymmetry improves welfare21, while in negative-lower-bound cases
ex-ante asymmetry impairs welfare. In the appendix, I give two numerical examples that favor
both cases, respectively. The critical example is 0-AUD war, which refers to the family of AUD
wars with zero lower bounds, as Proposition 1 suggests that eN(u) = e∞(u) always holds under
0-AUD wars and asymmetry has no influence.
Notice that in the AUD-war example, when the probability of the type valuing the public
good less than his cost increases, the introduction of asymmetry tends to impair efficiency. This
regularity can be generalized to other AD wars. Consider a sequence of symmetric N -player AD
20This notion of potential probability is only an intuitive, rather than accurate, demonstration of the positive
effect of increasing population on welfare.
21Some remarks. This example gives a different result from Bliss and Nalebuff’s (1984) Theorem 2 and
Grandstein’s (1992) Lemma 1(ii), both of which state that increasing the population in a symmetric public-good
provision game makes everyone better off. The reason lies in the difference in model setups, for example, my
model regards player’s valuation as uncertain and incorporates the possibility of v < c.
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wars in which each game has identical provision cost, c, and identical upper bound, v, and this
sequence converges to a dead game where for each player the probability of his valuation being
less than his cost is one. Then, when integer n becomes sufficiently large, the nth game in this
sequence yields an expected discount factor smaller than that under the associated infinite-player
game. The reason is that as the sequence converges to the dead game, the associated expected
discount factor approaches zero, however, Theorem 2 tells that for each game in this sequence
the expected discount factor calculated under its associated infinite-player game is 1− c/v > 0.
5 Discussion
5.1 Insights
The main insights of my analysis are summarized as follows. First, ex-ante asymmetry differen-
tiates individuals into distinct incentive positions, whereby they become active sequentially in
equilibrium. Second, the strongest type mainly determines the cost of delay generated in a war
of attrition by “controling” the behavior of all types. Lastly, introducing asymmetry that rein-
forces the strongest type tends to improve efficiency, while in the situation where the strongest
type is controlled, the positive effect of asymmetry hinges on the positive cost of symmetry.
These features have compelling power in explaining economic phenomena. Take the infamous
Mekong River massacre22 for example. A surprising consequence of this tragedy is the estab-
lishment of security system led by China that aims to repress illegal activities in the Golden
Triangle, which used to be a paradise for drug dealers and outlaws. The leadership in build-
ing this system can be seen as a privately provided public good, and the situations before and
after this massacre correspond to two wars of attrition differing from each other in that the
incentives faced by China are drastically different. Before the event, Golden Triangle generated
more negative influence on its neighbors, Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar, while China was not
directly concerned, although it has stronger executive power. As a result, countries kept passing
the buck, and the riot had been dealt with in a delayed and inefficient way, as predicted by
symmetric or less asymmetric equilibrium. Nevertheless, the inhuman violence against Chinese
ships incentivized China to intervene not only because of the pursuit for justice but also be-
cause China realized the importance of guaranteeing security for Chinese commercial activities
in Southeast Asia.23 The asymmetry that makes China, the (potentially) strongest player in
this game, salient dramatically accelerates the overdue formation of security cooperation, as
predicted by Theorem 3.
22The introduction of this event on Wikipedia: “... on the morning of 5 October 2011, ... two Chinese cargo
ships were attacked on a stretch of the Mekong River in the Golden Triangle region on the borders of Myanmar
(Burma) and Thailand. All 13 crew members on the two ships were killed and dumped in the river. ... In
response, China ... reached an agreement with Myanmar, Thailand and Laos to jointly patrol the river. The
event was also the impetus for the Naypyidaw Declaration and other anti-drug cooperation efforts in the region.”
23About half a year after the event, Chicago Tribune made comments on China’s motives that “(t)he patrols,
ostensibly conducted with Myanmar, Laos and Thailand, have been seen as an expansion of Beijing’s growing
role in regional security, extending its law enforcement down the highly strategic waterway.”
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5.2 Redistribution
The central provision of public good, referring to the instant provision by a central party who
has coercive power to tax and give orders, is commonly believed to be a good way to alleviate
the loss incurred by the private provision.24 However, this solution fails to avoid the mistakes
out of the central party’s lack of information. Since the central party makes its decision only
based on incomplete information, the provision of public good may generate negative ex-post
total surplus (
∑n
i=1 vi < c) with considerable probability, even though the ex-ante total surplus
is positive (
∑n
i=1E[vi] > c), for which the provision decision is made.
Following the ideas displayed in Section 4, I propose that when there is private information,
a central party can do at least not worse than central provision by making redistribution in a
certain way to asymmetrize players’ incentives in a war of attrition, and sometimes this strategy
is strictly better than central provision. Redistribution absorbs the advantage of private provision
(war of attrition) that private information is partially revealed. Specifically, any provision in a
war of attrition implies a high valuation of the provider, which always brings non-negative ex-
post total surplus. Therefore, when the central party makes redistribution, what it essentially
does is to use this fact to “nudge” the high-valuation players to reveal sooner with asymmetry.
Consider the following procedure. At t = 0, the central party announces a redistribution plan
which it promises to implement at the provision moment, defined as the moment when someone
provides the public good, in the following war of attrition. Assume that players trust this party
and thus incorporate this plan in their incentives. Since the plan is fixed beforehand, the war of
attrition remains a strategically static game but with its information structure changed.
I use a two-player symmetric 0-AUD war parametrized by w0 = {c < v} to demonstrate
one typical example of the redistribution plan. For instance, the central party promises to
redistribute y from player 2 to player 1 at the provision moment only when player 1 provides, or
no redistribution happens. This case equivalently reduces both players’ cost to c− y and moves
player 2’s valuation domain downwards to [−y, v − y], which generates asymmetry.25
For a generically and properly parametrized public-good provision problem, I denote the set
of all possible redistribution plans by D. To select the optimal plan, the central party computes
maxd∈DW (d) whereW (d) is the party’s objective integral under the war-of-attrition equilibrium
conditional on the implementation of d, and by d∗ I denote the selected plan.
Importantly, for all W (.) the associated d∗ is not worse than either private provision or
central provision. Obviously, the private-provision case corresponds to d0 =“doing nothing”∈ D
which thus has W (d0) ≤ W (d
∗). On the other hand, assume that the central party conducts
central provision by ordering the lowest-cost player to provide with his cost covered by the
money taxed from others, and I denote this operation by d̃c. Then, the central-provision case
selects d1 such that W (d1) = max{W (d0),W (d̃c)}. Note that d̃c yields the outcome equivalent
24For discussions in literature, see Bergstrom et al.’s (1986) Section 5 for a classic analysis on the effect of
government supply on underprovision problem, and Grandstein’s (1992) Section 5 for a discussion on several
solutions to delay including mechanism, redistribution (he refers to subsidization), and coercive provision.
25Other interesting examples are plans that employ probabilistic transfer, which refers to redistributing ỹ from
player 2 to player 1 where ỹ is a random variable, to change the shape of players’ valuation distributions; or plans
that make time-dependent transfer y = y(t) where t refers to the provision moment, and if y(t) is decreasing the
targeted player will be incentivized to exit sooner for there is another opportunity cost of waiting.
26
to that of the associated redistribution plan, denoted by dc ∈ D, in which the central party
promises to tax players at the provision moment in the same way as in d̃c and meanwhile
transfer the tax to the lowest-cost player only when this player provides. The reason, similar
to the example given before, is that this plan reduces the cost faced by the lowest-cost player
to zero, which makes instant provision with probability one a dominant strategy. Consequently,
W (d∗) ≥ max{W (d0),W (dc)} = max{W (d0),W (d̃c)} = W (d1).
Finally, I show an example where redistribution is strictly better than central provision under
the objective of maximizing expected total surplus. Consider a two-player symmetric AD war
parametrized by ω = {F, c = v = 1, v > 0} such that E[v1]+E[v2] < c. This example represents
the situation where private provision is not possible since the highest valuation is no greater than
the cost, and also central provision is not possible since the expected total surplus it generates
is assumed to be negative. Consequently, the objective integral W = 0 in both cases. However,
suppose the central party announces a redistribution plan that it promises to transfer a small ǫ
from player 2 to player 1 at the provision moment only when the latter provides. As a result,
player 1 will provide instantly if his type is almost 1, namely v1 > 1 − ǫ, and therefore the
expected total surplus must be greater than Prob(v1 > 1− ǫ)× (1− ǫ+E[v2]− c) = Prob(v1 >
1 − ǫ) × (E[v2] − ǫ) which is positive if ǫ is selected to be less than E[v2], which is positive for
v > 0. Thus, there exists some redistribution that yields higher objective integral than that by
the central provision. This example demonstrates how the central party uses partial revelation
to make fewer mistakes, which makes the partial instant provision possible in this case.
5.3 Related Paper
I differentiate this paper from Kambe (2019). His article is the most related to mine, but the
results are nonetheless very different due to both the two-type information structure considered
in his setup and his distinct focus on economic issues.
For one thing, Kambe (2019) assumes that each player is anticipated to have only two possible
types. This paper shows that players’ behavior is different when the continuous-type distribution
is assumed. First, the continuity at vi = ci for all players allows provision to occur after any
sufficiently long time (Lemma 1(ii)). An explanation is that: first, the right-above-cost type
vi = ci + ǫ where ǫ > 0 is sufficiently small is always willing to wait longer if there is positive
probability of others’ providing after him, so that all players’ maximal stopping time must be
the same; and further, the rate on the right side of equation (2) at which each player reveals his
information drops quickly to zero when ǫ→ 0, and thus the choice made by this type is delayed
rapidly so that the common maximal stopping time cannot be finite.
The second difference is a consequent proposition of the previous one. In my continuous-
type equilibrium, players become active sequentially, and once one becomes active, he cannot
return to the passive state. However, Kambe (2019) gives an example in which asymmetry is
fairly large and hence some active player will exhaust the possibility of exit before the arrival
of the maximal stopping time, and some passive player will become active at this exhaustion
moment. In other words, in a two-type equilibrium, active players may become passive again
after ruling out the possibility of him being a regular type. The explanation for this difference is
that continuous-type distribution subjects positive density to the right-above-cost type which,
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as stated before, does not allow any provision probability of others to exist after his stopping
time.
For the other, Kambe (2019) pays more attention to Who provides first? and How much
does he provide? Specifically, Kambe’s (2019) Section 4 carries out discussion on instant exit.
He argues that the probability of instant exit is positively related to efficiency. However, he does
not validate this argument by comparing instant-exit probability with other possible measures
of welfare, for example, expected discount factor employed in this paper which also includes
the non-instant-exit case. The truth is that the two-type setup actually makes the integral with
respect to stopping time very complex, and thus this validation is difficult. In contrast, there are
several special yet representative cases of my continuous-type setup whose expected-discount-
factor functions are tractable, like AD war and large-population society.
What makes my alternative measure of welfare important is that certain examples show that
the probability of instant exit may not be a good representation of efficiency. For example,
Proposition 1 tells that the expected discount factor under 0-AUD-war equilibrium manifests
complete irrelevance to instant-exit probability when the strongest type is fixed. Moreover,
Theorem 4 tells that when the cost of symmetry is negative (for example, negative-lower-bound
AUD war) asymmetry that controls the strongest type impairs efficiency, which implies that
instant-exit probability may even have a negative influence.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1.
I first prove the necessity. (i) For all i ∈ IN , the dominant strategy for player vi < ci is
Ti(vi) = +∞, since any provision of i yields negative gain while waiting forever brings zero. In
contrast, for player vi > ci, Ti(vi) cannot be +∞, since otherwise, player vi can be better off by
changing his provision time to a finite point, say Tm, whereby he gains at least (vi − ci)e
−riTm .
(ii) I show that there exists a T ∈ R+ ∪ {0,+∞} such that limv→ci+0 Ti(v) = T for all
i ∈ IN . Assume otherwise that minj∈IN limv→cj+0 Tj(v) = t 6= t = maxj∈IN limv→cj+0 Tj(v),
and this means that the former player associated with the minimal limit, denoted by k, faces
a positive probability q∗ of someone providing after t. Then, for a sufficiently small ǫ > 0,
player ck + ǫ can be better off by changing his stopping time to t, whereby he gains at least
q∗vke
−rkt − ǫ(e−rkt − e−rkt), which becomes positive when ǫ → 0. The property that T = +∞
can be easily proved after I show the validity of (v) and (vi), and I will demonstrate this later.
(iii) First, I show that Ti(.) is non-increasing for all i ∈ IN . In equilibrium, player vi and
player ṽi both reach optimality, which gives:
Ri(Ti(vi)|vi) ≥ Ri(Ti(ṽi)|vi)
Ri(Ti(ṽi)|ṽi) ≥ Ri(Ti(vi)|ṽi)
Adding these two inequations together and by the definition of Ri(.|.) in (1), we have (vi −




e−rit(1− Fmin−i (t)). This means that φi(Ti(.)) is non-decreasing. Since dF
min
−i /dt has meaning in




Fmin−i (t)) ≤ 0 implying that φi(.) is non-increasing, and thus Ti(.) is non-increasing.
Now, I prove that in equilibrium, there must be at least two players whose highest types
provide at t = 0 by contradiction. First, suppose there is no one whose highest type exits
instantly, by the monotonicity proved above, there is no instant-exit type. Then, for a sufficiently
small ǫ > 0, there is a type vk such that Tk(vk) ≤ infj∈IN ,vj∈[vj ,vj ] Tj(vj) + ǫ and Tk(vk) > 0.
Player vk can be better off by changing his stopping time to t = 0, since there is almost no
probability for others to exit at t ∈ [0, Tk(vk)). And second, if there is only one player, say j,
whose highest type exits instantly, then for a sufficiently small ǫ > 0, there is a type vk such
that Tk(vk) = infj∈IN−{j},vj∈[vj ,vj ] Tj(vj) + ǫ and Tk(vk) > 0. In this case, player j should have
almost no incentive to provide at t ∈ (0, Tk(vk)), during which others have almost no probability
of exit. Given this gap in j’s strategy, player vk can be better off by providing slightly earlier.
Thus, there are at least two players whose highest types exit instantly or, equivalently, there can
be at most N − 2 players whose minimal stopping times are greater than 0.
(iv) I prove by contradiction. Suppose there are m > 1 players who provide at t = 0 with
positive probabilities, any instant-exit type of any one of them, say vk ∈ (mk, vk], can be better
off by slightly delaying the stopping time. Formally, define pk = Prob(anyone other than k





ck)+(1−pk)(vk− ck)], which will be positive as ǫ→ 0.
Thus, there can be at most one player who exits instantly with a positive probability.
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(v) First, I show the continuity. Assume otherwise that Ti(.) is discontinuous at some v
∗
i , and
by the non-increasing monotonicity proved in (iii), we have limv→v∗i −0 Ti(v)− limv→v∗i +0 Ti(v) =
τ > 0. Let t∗i = limv→v∗i +0 Ti(v). The optimality of player v
∗
i indicates that he is indifferent
between providing at t∗ and t∗ + τ , but this cannot be true unless there is no probability of
others providing during (t∗, t∗ + τ). However, this vacancy contradicts some players’ optimality,
since for the player v∗i − ǫ where ǫ > 0 is sufficiently small, he can be better off by stopping
sooner during this vacancy period instead of after Ti(v
∗
i ). Thus, no discontinuity should appear.
Further, I show the strict monotonicity. The non-increasing monotonicity and the continuity
bring only one possible exception: for some i ∈ IN , there exists some non-empty set (ui, ui) ⊂
(ci,mi), on which Ti remains constant, say as t0. However, this player’s pooling exit brings
discontinuity to other Tj(.), because suppose they are all continuous functions, there exists
a player v∗k such that Tk(v
∗
k) = t0 − ǫ where ǫ > 0 is sufficiently small. Player v
∗
k can be






∗), which becomes positive as ǫ→ 0. Hence, Ti(.) is continuous
and strictly decreasing, and this indicates the existence of the inverse function Φi(.).
(vi) This part follows the spirits of Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1986) proof of their Lemma 1(iv).
For every t > t > Tk(vk), if the war is still active at t, player vk prefers to exiting immediately
to waiting any longer to exit. Consider the process in which vk waits till t instead of t. The
marginal profit from winning with higher probability minus the extra waiting cost gives the

















− rk(vk − ck)(t− t) ⇒
∣∣Fmin−k (t)− Fmin−k (t)
∣∣ ≤ λk|t− t|
The inequation above shows that Fmin−k (.) is Lipschitz continuous and thus also absolutely con-
tinuous. The Lipschitz constant λk = rk(1− ck/vk). Further, notice that:
Fmin−k (t) = Prob(min
j 6=k










For all i ∈ IN , Fi(Φi(t)) can be written as an expression of F
min
−k (t) for all k only by simple








One thing noteworthy is that although the function above y(x) = x1/(N−1) is not Lipschitz
continuous at x = 0, 1 − Fmin−k (t) remains strictly positive when t < +∞, which guarantees
the Lipschitz continuity of y(.) on the domain of interest. Therefore, Fi(Φi(.)) is also abso-
lutely continuous. Next, because of the boundedness of fi(.), F
−1
i (.) is Lipschitz continuous, as
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|F−1i (v) − F
−1
i (v)| ≤ |v − v|maxv∈[vi,vi](1/fi(v)). Thus, Φi(.) = F
−1
i (Fi(Φi(.))) is preserved to
be absolutely continuous, which indicates that Φi(.) is differentiable almost everywhere.
Now, I show equations (2). But before this, I need to clarify why there can be M ≤ N Φ-
curves that have definition at some time point. The reason lies in the existence of strict waiting
suggested in clause (iii), as once some player k chooses to wait strictly for Tk(vk) = tk > 0,
any of his opponents’ stop-time choice, say t < tk, will not be affected locally by Tk(.), since
Prob(Tk > t) = Fk(vk) remains constant as one near this moment. Formally, when at some t > 0
there areM Φ-curves that have definition whose subscripts are denoted by I(t) = {j1, j2, ..., jM},
the function Fmin−ji in Rji(t|v) becomes 1 −
∏M
k=1,k 6=i Fjk(Φjk(t)). Further, fixing the opponents’
strategy profile, the first-order condition for the maximization of player ji’s expected gain gives:
d
dtji






























lnFjk(Φjk(t)) = rji(Φji(t)− cji), ji ∈ I(t)





















This equation above yields exactly equation (2). What is worth mentioning is that the group of
equations in (2) satisfies local Lipschitz condition wherever it has definition.
Lastly, I verify limv→ci+0 Ti(v) = T = +∞. Suppose not, this means that the equilibrium
must coincide with the solution of the initial-value problem in which (2) serves as the group of
equations and {Φi(T ) = ci, i ∈ IN} as the boundary conditions. However, {Φi(t) ≡ ci, i ∈ IN} is
obviously one possible solution of this initial-value problem, and since the equations satisfy local
Lipschitz condition at the boundary conditions, this is the unique solution which is however not
acceptable, for Φi(0) = ci < mi for all i ∈ IN violates clause (iv).
Now, I prove the sufficiency. I only need to prove that Ri(t|vi) reaches global optimality at
t = Ti(vi) for all i ∈ IN . This directly results from the strictly decreasing monotonicity of each












Substituting equation (3) for the first term above, we have (rji/cji)(Φji(t)− vji). Since Φji(.) is
strictly decreasing and equals vji when t = Tji(vji), dRji(t|vji)/dt ≷ 0 when t ≷ Tji(vji). Thus,
Ti(.) gives the globally optimal choice when the rival strategy profile is fixed. Q.E.D.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 2.







(0)). I show that for all t > 0 Φi(t,m
(1)) > Φi(t,m
(0)). Assume otherwise the existence
of some s > 0 such that Φi(s,m
(1)) = Φi(s,m
(1)), but this is not possible, because the presence
of s means that the two solutions {Φi(.,m
(0)), i ∈ IM} and {Φi(.,m
(1)), i ∈ IM} are obtaind by
the same boundary conditions {Φj(0) = mj, j ∈ IM − {i}} ∪ {Φi(s) = Φi(s,m
(0))} so that these
two solutions must coincide violating Φi(0,m
(1)) 6= Φi(0,m
(0)).
Second, for all j ∈ IM − {i} equations (2) show that ∂Φj(0,m
(0))/∂t > ∂Φj(0,m
(1))/∂t,
which means that there exists a small domain t ∈ (0, u) where Φj(t,m
(0)) > Φj(t,m
(1)). It also
holds that for all t > 0 Φj(t,m
(0)) > Φj(t,m
(1)), since otherwise there will be an s such that
Φj(s,m
(0)) = Φj(s,m
(1)), which is not possible for a similar reason illustrated in the first part
of proof of this clause.
(iii) For some i ∈ IM , all j ∈ IM , m ∈ BM , and t > 0, consider the initial-value problem
characterizing ∂Φj(t,m)/∂mi = z
(i)
j . For all r ∈ IM , denote the funtion on the right side
of player r’s equation (2) by gr(Φ1,Φ2, ...,ΦM). According to differential equation theory, the
differentiability of each gr, which is ensured by the differentiability and boundedness of all
(Fr, fr), along with the satisfaction of Lipschitz condition ensures the existence of each z
(i)
j .
Specifically, the initial-value problem determining {z
(i)























































k , j ∈ IM
z
(i)
1 (0) = 0, z
(i)
2 (0) = 0, ..., z
(i)
i−1(0) = 0, z
(i)
i+1(0) = 0, ..., z
(i)
M (0) = 0
z
(i)
i (0) = 1
The boundary conditions above are obvious, since mi is the only variable parameter in differen-
tiation. Further, now that Φι(s,m) → cι as s → +∞ for all ι ∈ IM , when time approximates
infinity the complicated equations above are simplified to a group of linear equations with con-
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, j ∈ IM (9)
Since clause (i) indicates that for all t > 0 z
(i)
i (t) > 0 and z
(i)
j (t) < 0 for all j 6= i, according to
(9), when t→ +∞ dz
(i)
i /dt > 0. Another fact here is in similar form to (iii): the only convergent
solution satisfies z
(i)
j → 0 for all j ∈ IM . This is because convergence requires dz
(i)
j /dt→ 0 for all









M − 2 −1 · · · −1









AM is invertible, because its determinant det(AM) = −(M − 1)
M−1 6= 0, so that the unique





for all k. Then, z
(i)





i suggesting that z
(i)
i is increasing no slower than ae
Hit, and consequently z
(i)
i → +∞ as
t→ +∞.
Next, I show that z
(i)
j → −∞ for j 6= i. Assume otherwise that for some k z
(i)
k approximates
some 0 ≥ −v∗k > −∞
26. This along with z
(i)









k /dt → 0. However, this is not possible, for when t becomes large z
(i)
k ’s
equation (9) actually becomes dz
(i)




k) giving a solution that approximates −∞,
a contradiction.
(ii) First consider convergent case, in which each curve i approximates a finite value, say









(v∞k − ck) = 0
These are linear equations whose constant coefficient matrix is identical to the invertible AM
defined in (iii)’s proof. Consequently, the only possible solution is {v∞i = ci, i ∈ IM}.
Now I show why any PM solution converging in this way must satisfy Lemma 1(ii) and
(v), namely, each curve Φi(.) keeps decreasing from t = 0 and respectively approximates ci from
above. I denote the boundaries yielding this solution bym. First, each curve imust remain above
ci, since if not, the fact that Φi(0,m) > ci for all i indicates that there exists a u > 0 and k ∈ IM
such that Φk(u,m) = ck while Φj(u,m) ≥ cj where at least one ≥ is strict. However, this can
only bring divergence. Notice that equations (2) are time-invariant and when I reset u as the new
26Since (9) is a group of linear equations with constant coefficients, when its solution curves do not diverge,
they must converge to a finite point.
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zero time, a new PM problem with identical equations, {IM , BM , (c, r, F, f)i, (Φ̃(t,m))i}, emerges,
whereas the boundary conditions become {Φ̃k(0) = ck}∪ {Φ̃j(0) = Φj(u,m), j 6= k}. Remember
that these boundaries can be seen as Φ̃j(0) in m0 = {Φ̃i(0) = ci, i ∈ IM} being raised from 0 to
Φj(u,m) for all j 6= k, and also that m0 yields the benchmark solution {Φ̃i(t,m0) ≡ ci, i ∈ IM}.
Due to the asymptotic sensitivity introduced in (iii), any rise of each Φ̃j(0) will cause Φ̃k(+∞,m0)
to drop sharply, namely, Φ̃k(t) → vk in distance, a contradiction to Φ̃k(t) → ck.
Additionally, I need to explain why convergent Φi(.)s are decreasing. Since I have shown
Φi > 0 and that in distance (2) approximates linear equations with constant coefficients, the
fact that Φi(t) → ci+0 implies that when t→ +∞ each Φi(t) approximates a linear combination
of several decreasing exponential terms like e−λt, tre−λt, and sinwte−λt, where r, w, and λ > 0.
As a result, there exists a large time T such that Φ
′
i(t) < 0 for all i ∈ IM and t ≥ T . Then, I
show that Φ
′
i < 0 must also hold for all i before T , because if not, there exists some s such that
for some k ∈ IM Φ
′
k(s) = 0, and I denote the nearest such s as u. At u, it cannot be Φ
′
i(u) = 0









(Φk(u)− ck), i ∈ IM
By summing up both sides of every i’s inequation above, one can easily obtain a contradiction,
so there is at least one r∗ such that Φ
′
r∗(u) > 0. For any one of k such that Φ
′
k(u) = 0, I assume
Φ
′
k turns to positive right before u, so that there exist two sufficiently close points, say u1 and
u2, such that u1 < u < u2 and Φk(u1) = Φk(u2). At these two points, k’s (2) along with the














(Φk(u1)− Φk(u2)) < 0
This inequation contradicts Φ
′
k(u1) > 0 > Φ
′
k(u2), so there is no such u and therefore all Φi(.)
are strictly decreasing. Q.E.D.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 1.
First, I formally introduce the backward induction strategy and some useful notations. Accord-
ing to Lemma 1(iii), there areK ≤ N−2 divisions located at 0 < DK < DK−1 < ..., < D1 < +∞,
and I add DK+1 = 0 and D0 = +∞ for convenience. I denote the set of subscripts of the players
who are active during t ∈ [DK , DK−1] by I(DK) and the number of these players byM(K). Each
division DK starts, on its right, a PM(K) problem on area Υ(M(K)). Peculiarly, the rightmost is
a PN problem with no division on its right side, so Lemma 2(ii) requires that this problem must
select a set of boundary conditions yielding a convergent solution. The process of searching for
equilibrium starts with finding the unique convergent solution of this PN problem whose left-side
boundaries satisfy that Φi(D1) ≤ vi for all i ∈ IN and Φk(D1) = vk for at least one k ∈ IN .
Then, in a backward order, K = 1, 2, ..., K, I sequentially consider the M(K + 1) problem on
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each Υ(M(K + 1)) whose boundary conditions are the values of the solution curves at t = DK
determined in the previous M(K) problem. For each K, adjust the distance between DK+1
and DK , and fix this comparative distance in all the following problems with bigger Ks. Each
adjustment of DK −DK+1 is determined to be such that Φi(DK+1) ≤ vi for all i ∈ I(DK+1) and
Φk(DK+1) = vk for at least one k ∈ I(DK+1). Also, for each K M(K + 1) is obtaind by elimi-
nating any such subscript k such that Φk(DK) = vk from M(K). This sequential adjustment of
DKs and determination of M(.) end when some large K
∗ occurs which is such that M(K∗) =1
or 0, and K = K∗ − 1 is thus determined. Finally, I verify that this strategy gives all possible
solutions satisfying Lemma 1 and only one such solution is found. I divide the proof into 4 steps.
Step 1: For the rightmost PN problem, define ∆(B
(−1)





k=1,k 6=1[ck,+∞), and define a function ψ : [c1,+∞) → ∆(B
(−1)
N ). Each m
(−1) ∈






N−1) is a boundary
selection yielding a convergent solution of this PN problem.
In this step, I show that for each m1 ∈ [c1,+∞) ψ(m1) is either empty or a singleton. Now I
fix m1 and find its corresponding boundary set, ψ(m1), with each of whose element m1 yields a
convergent solution. I begin by defining some notations. I choose a time sequence (tn)
∞
n=1 such





k=1,k 6=1[ci, ci + v0] → B
(−1)
N as a






N−1) is the boundary
selection that yields a solution satisfying Φi(tn) = vi−1 for all i ∈ IN − {1}. Geometrically, φ
(n)
is the link of two forms of boundary conditions, {Φi(0) = m
(−1)
i−1 , i ∈ IN − {1}} ∪ {Φ1(0) = m1}
and {Φi(tn) = vi−1, i ∈ IN − {1}} ∪ {Φ1(0) = m1} where each vi is bounded by [ci, ci + v0], and
because of the satisfaction of Lipschitz condition, this link is unique and invertible. Further,
define ψ(n)(v0) as the set φ
(n)(C
(−1)
N ) ∩ B
(−1)
N .
Based on Lemma 2(ii), ψ(m1|v0) ⊂ ψ(m1), because each element of ψ(m1|v0) withm1 yields a
solution satisfying Φi(tn → +∞) remains finite for all i ≥ 2, which indicates that Φ1(tn → +∞)
must remains finite according to (2), and thus this is a Lemma-1(ii)-and-(v) convergent solution.
Additionally, ψ(m1|v0) is a singleton if it exists and is non-empty. The continuity of φ
(n)(.),
which is implied by the partial differentiability of Φs with respect to each mi in Lemma 2(iii),




N are compact, and thus the limit





2 , sufficiently close to each other, and the asymptotic sensitivity in





(−1) = (∆m2,∆m3, ...,∆mN) must











j /cj = (rj/cj)∂Φj/∂mi, and the conditions above become that∑N
k=2 ∆mky
(k)
i = 0 for all i. When t→ +∞, y
(i)
j is charactrized by (9), and according to Lemma
2(iii), y
(i)
i → +∞ and y
(i)
j → −∞ for all i, j 6= i. Notice that (9) is linear so that each y
(i)
j is
a linear combination of several exponential terms, like eλt, eλttr, and eλt sinwt where r, w > 0.
An important property of this kind of combination is that, if one function has a strictly higher
exponential order than another, the absolute value of the former will surpass that of the latter
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when t → +∞27. Then for all k, I select one p 6= k such that y
(k)
p has the lowest exponential
order in {y
(k)
j , j 6= k} and denote this p by p(k), and also select another p(k) such that y
(k)
p(k) has
the highest exponential order. p(k) and p(k) may not be unique, but I just select one of the













j , k ∈ IN − {1}
The asymptotic domination property of higher exponential order necessarily requires that the
right side of the inequation above should be non-negative. This is because, if it goes negative,
this must be caused by the dominant order of y
(k)
p(k), and therefore this term will eventually goes
to −∞ faster than y
(k)


















j |, k ∈ IN − {1}
This strict inequation indicates that the following matrix, Γ(−1), is strictly diagonally dominant,



































i = 0 for all i ∈ IN − {1}, is equivalent
to Γ(−1)∆m(−1) = 0, and the invertibility of Γ(−1) concludes that all ∆mk = 0. When N = 2, the
case becomes trivial, as Φi(+∞, (m1,m
(−1)
1 )) − Φi(+∞, (m1,m
(−1)
2 )) = y
(2)
i ∆m2 = 0 implying




2 , so ψ(m1|v0) is a singleton if it is non-empty. And
obviously, v0 here only serves as a measure of convergence and is irrelevant to ψ(m1|v0), so
ψ(m1) = ψ(m1|v0) contains every possible solution.
Step 2: In this step, I show that for each m1 ∈ [c1,+∞) ψ(m1) is non-empty. I begin
this part by first showing that for each v ∈ C
(−1)
N φ





N , and m






28) = vi for all i ∈ IN − {1}. Clearly, G(.|v) is non-empty, and this is
because, since the benchmark boundaries {Φi(0) = ci, i ∈ IN} yield Φi(tn) = 0, the fact that
27For example, eλ1 > eλ2 if λ1 > λ2, and t
r1eλ > tr2eλ if r1 > r2.
28This is an N -dimension vector with its first component being m1, the ith component being the ith of m
G,
and the rest respectively taken by m(−1)’s components other than its ith.
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m1 ≥ c1 and for all k m
(−1)
k ≥ ck gives that Φi(tn, (m1, 0,m
(−1)
−i )) ≤ ci according to Lemma 2(i),




−i )) = vi ≥ ci must require m
G




Denote anN−1-dimension initial pointm(0)(v) = (c2, c3, ..., cN) andm
(ν+1)(v) = G(n)(m(ν)(v)|v)






−i (v))) = vi ≥ ci along with Lemma 2(i) gives m
(1)
i (v) ≥ m
(0)
i (v) for all i.
Further, since for all j m
(1)
j (v) ≥ m
(0)









along with Lemma 2(i) gives m
(2)
i (v) ≤ m
(1)
i (v) for all i. And also m
(2)
i (v) ≥ m
(0)
i (v) for
all i, because Φi(tn, (m1,m
(0)
i (v) = ci,m
(1)
−i (v))) ≤ ci ≤ vi. Consequently, m
(2)
i (v) lies be-
tween m
(1)
i (v) and m
(0)
i (v). Then from ν = 3, m
(ν−1)





i (v) for all i, because if one assumes that this holds true for some ν = k ≥ 3, then
since for all j m
(k−1)
j (v) lies between m
(k−2)
j (v) and m
(k−3)













−i (v))) along with Lemma 2(i)
must give that m
(k)
i (v) lies between m
(k−1)
i (v) and m
(k−2)
i (v) for all i, which extends this re-
lationship to ν = k + 1.
This next-in-middle property leaves only two possible results: either that m(ν)(v) → m(∞)(v)
uniquely exists, or that there are two points, saym(a)(v) andm(b)(v), such that G(n)(m(a)(v)|v) =
m(b)(v), G(n)(m(b)(v)|v) = m(a)(v), and, without loss of generality, m
(a)
i (v) > m
(b)
i (v) for all i. I
prove that the latter case never occurs. The relationship between m(a)(v) and m(b)(v) implies








−i (v))), but the fact that for
all j m
(a)
j (v) > m
(b)









−i (v))), a contradiction.
All discussion above shows one thing: G(n)(.|v) has a unique fixed point in B
(−1)
N . And
this fixed point obviously is φ(n)(v), and thus this function if non-empty. Moreover, the nth
set ψ(n)(m1|v0) = φ
(n)(C
(−1)
N ) is non-empty. Now rewrite ψ
(n)(m1|v0) as a function of tn = t,
namely, ψ(t|m1, v0). The continuity of φ
(n)(.), which is implied by the partial differentiability
of Φs with respect to each mi in Lemma 2(iii), plus the continuity of each Φi(.) tells that
ψ(.|m1, v0) is upper semi-continuous, so the limit of a sequence containing non-empty sets,
ψ(tn → +∞|m1, v0) = ψ(m1), also exists and remains non-empty.
Combining the results of the first two steps, I conclude that for each m1 ≥ c1 there uniquely
exists a boundary selection, (m1,m2, ...,mN), yielding a convergent solution in the rightmost PN
problem.
Step 3: In this step, I characterize ψ(m1). For the preceding steps have shown that ψ
links each m1 to a unique point in B
(−1)
N , I decompose this mapping into N − 1 new func-
tions, m
(1)











i (c1) = ci for all i ∈ IN − {1}, which is obvious.
Additionally, I prove the strictly increasing monotonicity of each m
(1)
i (.). Consider a change
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of m1 to m1 + ∆m1 where ∆m1 is positive but small, and denote m
(1)
i (m1 + ∆m1) −m
(1)
i (m1)




i = 0 for all






j |, and that y
(k)
k → +∞ and y
(k)
j → −∞ for
all k, j 6= k. If for some k ∆mk < 0, then denote the set containing all such k by S
−, and define
S+ = IN − S






























k |) < 0
The inequation above constructs a contradiction, and thus ∆mi > 0 for all i.
Finally, I show that m
(1)
i (.) is continuous. Assume otherwise that for some k 6= 1 and
m∗1 ∈ [c1,+∞) limm→m∗1−0m
(1)




k (.) is strictly in-
creasing, this gap suggests that there is nom1 such thatm
(1)
k (m1) ∈ (mk,mk). To form contradic-
tion, for all i ∈ IN−{k} I define m
(k)











N (mk)) yields a con-
vergent solution. Based on all previous proof, these functions are non-empty and give a unique
set of boundary conditions for each mk. Thus, for all mk ∈ (mk,mk) m
(k)
1 (mk) exists and this is
a contradiction.
Step 4: In this step, I carry out the backward induction process and prove that it yields a
unique equilibrium. Lemma 1(iii) requires that at each division DK the solution curves existing
on its right, whose subscripts are contained in I(DK), take the values such that Φi(DK) ≤ vi
for all i ∈ I(DK) and Φk(DK) = vk for at least one k ∈ I(DK). For each K the comparative
distance, DK−1−DK , is adjusted to satisfy the condition given by Lemma 1(iii) above, and this
comparative distance will be fixed when it comes to latter adjustment of divisions with bigger
K. Denote the set of all such k satisfying Φk(DK) = vk by ∆I(DK), and on DK+1’s both sides it
has I(DK+1) = I(DK)−∆I(DK). This process starts from the determination of the rightmost
division, sequentially moves to the left, and ends when some K∗ occurs such that I(K∗) is ∅ or
a singleton, and the total number of division is determined by K = K∗ − 1, which is required
by Lemma 1(iv) that there must be at least two curves existing at t = 0.
I now prove that this process yields a unique solution. First consider the rightmost division,
since each m
(1)
i (m1) starts at ci when m1 = c1 and continuously increases as m1 rises, there






N (m1)) such that Φi(DK) ≤ vi
for all i ∈ IN and Φk(DK) = vk for at least one k ∈ IN .
Next, consider each area between two adjacent divisions. I prove by applying mathematical
induction that for each K ≥ 1 all curves existing in Υ(M(K)) are strictly decreasing. Obviously,
Lemma 2(ii) gives that the unique convergent solution in the rightmost Υ(M(1)) is strictly
decreasing. Now, suppose that for some K > 1 this decreasing property holds on Υ(M(K)).
Consider the behavior of each curve, say i ∈ I(DK−1), right on both sides of division DK , and
the values of this curve on both sides equals each other, while the derivative of it on the left side
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i(DK − 0)− Φ
′























































k(DK + 0) < 0
I cite one of the intermediate conclusions in the proof of Lemma 2(ii) that if in a M problem at
some t ∈ Υ(M) Φ
′
i(t) < 0 for all i ∈ I(t), then Φ
′
i(s) < 0 for all s ≤ t and i. Then for K +1, the
strictly decreasing monotonicity of curves in Υ(M(K + 1)) still holds, and this completes the
proof.
Finally, I show that the comparative distance, DK−DK+1, can be uniquely determined for all
K ≥ 1. Since, on each Υ(M(K + 1)) for all i ∈ I(DK+1), Φi(DK) < vi and that Φi(.) is strictly
deceasing on Υ(M(K + 1)), there is only one comparative distance satisfying Φi(DK+1) ≤ vi
for all i ∈ I(DK+1) and Φk(DK+1) = vk for at least one k ∈ I(DK+1). Along with the stop
criterion that the total number of division K = K∗ − 1 where M(K∗) = 0 or 1, the previous
conclusion confirms that there uniquely exists an object, E∗ = {K, (DK − DK+1)K , (mi =
Φi(D1))i}, characterizing a solution found in this backward induction. Since the structure of
this solution searching process is based on the requirement of Lemma 1, this process gives all
qualified equilibria, which has been proved to uniquely exist. Q.E.D.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Denote the corresponding unique equilibrium by e = {N,K,Φi, (dK ,MK , IK); i ∈ IN , K ∈ IK},







(Φk(t)− ck). Let K0 denote the smallest integer in IK such that
dK0+1 > t0. For all K ≥ K0, the equations for α and β on t ∈ [max{t0, dK}, dK+1) are:
d
dt











(i) Let r = rα = rβ. First, consider the case where fα(v)/Fα(v) = fβ(v)/Fβ(v) for all
v ∈ (c,min{vα, vβ}), with which (10) gives symmetric equations for α and β on [t0,+∞). The
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proof of uniqueness of the solution of the PN problem in Section 6.4 shows that this pair of
symmetric equations should yield symmetric curves in this last N problem. Therefore, the
boundary conditions for both players’ curves in the penultimate M problem are also symmetric,
which along with the symmetric equations yields a symmetric solution. Likewise, backward
induction gives that Φα(t) = Φβ(t) for all t ∈ [t0,+∞).
Next, without loss of generality, I only need to consider the case where fα(v)/Fα(v) >
fβ(v)/Fβ(v) for all v ∈ (c,min{vα, vβ}). Suppose there is an intersection point, say s ≥ t0, such




β(s), so the continuity of Φs requires that there
cannot be another intersection point, and thus for all t ≷ s, Φα(t) ≷ Φβ(t). Consequently, only
three possible cases can occur: a) one intersection point, b) no intersection and Φα(t) > Φβ(t)
for all t ≥ t0, or c) no intersection and Φα(t) < Φβ(t) for all t ≥ t0.
Now I show that a) and b) are not possible. These two cases are similar in that there exists
some τ ≥ t0 such that Φα(t) > Φβ(t) for all t ≥ τ . Let Kτ denote the smallest integer in IK
such that dKτ+1 > τ , and dK+1 denote +∞. Integrating (10) from τ to +∞ yields:
























Denote h(v) = lnFα(v)− lnFβ(v) and the inequation above can be written as h(Φβ(τ)) < h(c).
However, the facts that h
′
(v) = fα(v)/Fα(v) − fβ(v)/Fβ(v) > 0 and that Φβ(τ) > c together
form a contradiction to this inequation. The only possibility left is Φα(t) < Φβ(t) for all t ≥ t0.
(ii) Without loss of generality, I only discuss the case where cα > cβ. This condition indicates
that there exists a t∗ such that for all t > t∗ Φα(t) > Φβ(t). If Φα(.) and Φβ(.) intersect on the









β(u), a contradiction. Consequently, there is no intersction point on [t0,+∞) and
therefore Φα > Φβ is consistent.
(iii) Without loss of generality, I only discuss the case where rα > rβ. If Φα(.) and Φβ(.)




α(s). This property at an intersection
narrows the discussion to the three cases mentioned in the proof of (i), that is a), b), and c). Still,
a) and b) are not possible. Both cases imply the existence of a τ ≥ t0 such that Φα(t) > Φβ(t) for
all t ≥ τ . Integrating (10) in the same way as the proof of (i) yields h(Φβ(τ)) < h(c), where h(.)
is also defined previously. This inequation obviously contradicts the condition that h
′
(v) = 0 for
all v ∈ (c,Φβ(τ)). Therefore, Φα(t) < Φβ(t) for all t ≥ t0. Q.E.D.
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6.5 Numerical Demonstration
6.5.1 For Theorem 3
To demonstrate Theorem 3 numerically, I consider a two-group AUD war where 4 players are
divided equally into the two groups. Let parameters be r = 1, c = 1, and v0 = 3. By calculating
the expected discount factor (EDF) under different v1 ∈ [3, 5) and different v, I obtain Table 1.
v
EDF v1
3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8
0.9 0.689 0.718 0.741 0.759 0.775 0.788 0.799 0.809 0.817 0.824
0.5 0.679 0.704 0.725 0.743 0.758 0.772 0.783 0.794 0.803 0.811
0 0.667 0.688 0.706 0.722 0.737 0.750 0.762 0.773 0.783 0.792
-2 0.608 0.620 0.631 0.642 0.653 0.663 0.672 0.681 0.690 0.698
-10 0.401 0.404 0.408 0.411 0.414 0.416 0.419 0.422 0.425 0.428
-100 0.073 0.073 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074
Table 1
Note that no matter what lower bound is selected, expected discount factor is always in-
creasing with respect to the larger upper bound, v1. In other words, in a relatively wide range
of examples any introduction of asymmetry that strengthens the strongest type reduces cost of
delay. This extends Theorem 3’s scope of applicability.
6.5.2 For Theorem 4
To show an example that satisfies eN(u)− e∞(u) for all u ∈ (c, vm], I consider a symmetric AUD
war in which r = 1, c = 2, v = 1, and vm = 4. By calculating the expected discount factor
under different u ∈ (2, 4] and different population N ≥ 2, I obtain Table 2.
N
EDF u
2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0
2 0.116 0.206 0.278 0.337 0.386 0.428 0.465 0.497 0.525 0.549
4 0.102 0.183 0.251 0.307 0.355 0.397 0.433 0.466 0.494 0.520
6 0.098 0.177 0.243 0.299 0.347 0.389 0.425 0.458 0.486 0.512
8 0.096 0.174 0.240 0.296 0.343 0.385 0.422 0.454 0.483 0.509
10 0.095 0.173 0.238 0.294 0.341 0.383 0.420 0.452 0.481 0.507
∞ 0.091 0.167 0.231 0.286 0.333 0.375 0.412 0.444 0.474 0.500
Table 2
Table 2 indicates several interesting numerical regularities. First, for each finite N consid-
ered the expected discount factor is always greater than the infinite-population case under all
us. According to Theorem 4, this regularity implies that any introduction of asymmetry to the
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N -player (N=2,4,...,10) symmetric AUD war parametrized above improves efficiency. In addi-
tion, expected discount factor calculated under greater upper bound, which increases potential
provision probability, is also greater. Finally, expected discount factor is decreasing with respect
to population and this directly reveals the more-is-worse nature of this parametrization.
In contrast, I change the lower bound to v = −1 and preserve all other parameters used
above. Similarly, I obtain the result of a negative-lower-bound case in Table 3.
N
EDF u
2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0
2 0.074 0.139 0.196 0.246 0.290 0.330 0.366 0.398 0.428 0.454
4 0.082 0.152 0.213 0.266 0.313 0.354 0.391 0.423 0.453 0.480
6 0.085 0.157 0.219 0.273 0.320 0.361 0.398 0.431 0.461 0.488
8 0.086 0.159 0.222 0.276 0.323 0.365 0.402 0.435 0.464 0.491
10 0.087 0.161 0.224 0.278 0.326 0.367 0.404 0.437 0.466 0.493
∞ 0.091 0.167 0.231 0.286 0.333 0.375 0.412 0.444 0.474 0.500
Table 3
Obviously, the first and the third regularities found in the previous case is inverse here. With
a negative lower bound, expected discount factor is always increasing with respect to population
N , and this suggests that the symmetric game always yields the highest welfare level.
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